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This article is an updated and slightly revised version of the national report 
submitted by the author to the International Academy of Comparative Law's Second 
Thematic Congress. The theme of the Congress, held from May 24th to 26th 2012 at the 
National Taiwan University, was "Codification". The paper offers a systematic but brief 
account of the adjudicative protection of human rights, both collective and individual, in 
domestic law. Such an overview also provides the opportunity to identify a few trends in 
the development of the Canadian constitutional case law regarding human rights. Even 
if human rights had received quasi-constitutional protection several decades earlier, 
their codification as part of the supreme law of Canada in 1982 proved to be a signifi-
cant step forward. This is particularly true for the fundamental freedoms of expression 
and religion, and for “legal rights.” The picture is more mixed, however, regarding dem-
ocratic rights. Part II of the Constitution Act, 1982, relating to special rights of Aboriginal 
peoples, has had huge systemic repercussions. A notable source of concern is the Su-
preme Court’s continued hesitance on how to conceive of the relation between the Char-
ter’s individual rights and freedoms and the special rights of Aboriginal peoples 
recognized in Part II of the C.A. 1982. 
 
 
L’article qui suit est une version corrigée, mise à jour et légèrement remaniée du 
rapport national canadien produit au deuxième congrès thématique de l’Académie inter-
nationale de droit comparé. Ce congrès, qui fut tenu à l’université nationale de Taiwan 
du 24 au 26 mai 2012, avait pour thème « La Codification ». Le texte qui suit offre donc 
une présentation à la fois systématique et brève de la protection juridictionnelle des 
droits fondamentaux, collectifs comme individuels, en droit interne. De dresser un tel 
panorama devait du reste permettre de dégager certaines tendances d’évolution de la 
jurisprudence constitutionnelle canadienne relative aux droits fondamentaux. Même si 
la protection « quasi constitutionnelle » de ceux-ci y était alors réalité depuis quelques 
décennies, la « codification » des droits de la personne au sein de la « loi suprême » du 
Canada en 1982 devait se révéler comme un progrès considérable. Cela concerne au 
premier chef les libertés fondamentales de religion et d’expression ainsi que les « garan-
ties juridiques ». Le bilan est plus mitigé en ce qui concerne les droits démocratiques. La 
Partie II de la Loi constitutionnelle de 1982, relative aux droits spéciaux des peuples 
autochtones, a eu des répercussions systémiques énormes. Une source d’inquiétude est 
l’hésitation dont continue de faire montre la Cour suprême sur la question de la manière 
dont il convient de concevoir la relation entre les droits et libertés que la Charte garantit 
à la personne et les droits que la Partie II de la L.C. 1982 reconnaît en propre aux 
peuples autochtones. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Discussing the codification of human rights in Canada re-
quires a few preliminary observations regarding Canada’s consti-
tutional law. 
 
The Constitution of Canada encompasses a political com-
ponent and a legal component.1 The latter coincides with Canada’s 
constitutional law, while the former corresponds to constitutional 
conventions. The courts may define the existence and content of 
constitutional conventions, but may not enforce them.2 
 
Canada’s legal constitution is made up of written and un-
written norms. Only the former pertain directly to the issue of 
codification. The legal constitution also comprises rigid or formal 
constitutional law on the one hand, and on the other, flexible or 
material constitutional law. As Maxime St-Hilaire and Laurence 
Bich-Carrière express it: 
 
[TRANSLATION] Indeed, whether written or not, a norm 
may be constitutional in virtue of its status in the hierar-
chy of legal norms or in virtue of its content, if it ad-
dresses directly or indirectly the form of government of the 
state or the rights of individuals or groups with which the 
state may enter into relationships. In this sense, we can 
speak of rigid constitutional law in the former case, and of 
flexible constitutional law in the latter. Rigid constitu-
tional law is referred to as such simply because, standing 
at a higher level of authority than the ordinary law of 
which it intends to state the conditions of validity, appli-
cability and operability, it is logical that it cannot be modi-
fied by this ordinary law. If this rigid constitutional law is 
written, then the one or many texts that constitute it will 
                                                 
1.  M. ST-HILAIRE & L. BICH-CARRIÈRE, “La constitution juridique et politique 
du Canada : notions, sources et principes” in Droit constitutionnel, loose-leaf ed., 
JurisClasseur Québec, coll. “Droit public”, Montréal, LexisNexis, 2011. 
2.  See Re: Resolution to amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753 [Reso-
lution to amend the Constitution]; Reference re: Amendment to the Canadian 
Constitution, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 791. 
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typically provide the procedure for its amendment. If it is 
unwritten, that is to say, jurisprudential, then it will gen-
erally need to be modified by the constitutional jurisdic-
tion, which could be a constitutional court or a supreme 
court, for instance. Flexible constitutional law, for its part, 
can be amended by ordinary law, whether it is written and 
stems from ordinary statutes and decrees of implementa-
tion thereof, or whether it is unwritten and arises from 
any form of case law that is not constitutional, which 
means case law that can be modified by ordinary law. In 
this regard, one can just as well speak, as we will, of con-
stitutional law in the formal and in the material sense. 
However, one must refrain from confusing this distinction 
with the distinction between formal and material sources 
of law, constitutional law included [...].3 
 
Besides Canada’s colonial past, when the first mechanism 
in place for reviewing constitutionality was the required compli-
ance of colonial laws with imperial “constitutional” laws, the 
choice of federalism, made prior to Canada’s accession to the 
status of a sovereign state under international law, rendered it 
necessary to include in the Constitution Act rules assigning re-
spective spheres of jurisdiction to the federal government and the 
federate entities. The federation of British North American colonies 
also resulted in the protection of a limited range of rights in favor 
of certain religious and linguistic minorities. As a matter of fact, it 
is recognized that, in itself, the federal form of state organization 
protects cultural and linguistic diversity, as well as democracy at 
the local and regional levels. The Supreme Court held in the Ref-
erence re Secession of Quebec that “[t]he federal structure of our 
country also facilitates democratic participation by distributing 
power to the government thought to be most suited to achieving 
the particular societal objective having regard to this diversity”.4 
Later on, the transfer of the full constitution-making power from 
the United Kingdom to Canada prompted a revision of the Consti-
tution, by the end of which individual rights and freedoms, certain 
                                                 
3.  M. ST-HILAIRE & L. BICH-CARRIÈRE, supra note 1 at para. 8. 
4.  Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 [Secession of 
Quebec] at para. 58. 
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linguistic rights of minorities (in this case French and English), 
and rights of Aboriginal peoples had attained the status of su-
preme law.  
 
The Constitution Act, 1867 (the “C.A. 1867”)5 and the Consti-
tution Act, 1982 (the “C.A. 1982”)6 collectively form the most sig-
nificant part of Canadian formal constitutional law. As has been 
demonstrated by Maxime St-Hilaire and Laurence Bich-Carrière, 
the written part of this formal constitutional law, in reality, can be 
circumscribed only by means of a careful review of the C.A. 1982 
provisions on which the constitution-making power is founded, 
namely, provisions in its Part V relating to the “Procedure for 
amending Constitution of Canada”. 7  The unwritten part of the 
Constitution of Canada consists of case law that, beyond the in-
terpretation of the Constitution’s written part, has set out a num-
ber of “unwritten principles”, including the rule of law, the 
independence of the judiciary, democracy, federalism, the protec-
tion of minorities, and the honour of the Crown in its relations 
with Aboriginal peoples. Finally, subsection 52(1), C.A. 1982 gave 
express form to formal legal constitutionalism and, by implication, 
to constitutional judicial review, otherwise already established for 
decades, in the following terms : “The Constitution of Canada is 
the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with 
the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsis-
tency, of no force or effect.” The Supreme Court has confirmed 
that “of no force or effect”, in this instance, means “invalid”.8 
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (the “Char-
ter”) forms Part I of the C.A. 1982, while its Part II protects the 
specific rights of Aboriginal peoples. These two first parts of the 
C.A. 1982 provide the material for the first section of this report. 
                                                 
5.  British North America Act, (1867) 30-31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.), renamed Consti-
tution Act, 1867 by Section 53 of the Constitution Act, 1982 (U.K.), being Schedule 
B of the Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [Constitution Act, 1867]. 
6.  Constitution Act, 1982 (U.K.), being Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982 
(U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
7.  See M. ST-HILAIRE & L. BICH-CARRIÈRE, supra note 1 at para. 20. 
8.  See Re Manitoba Language Rights, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 721 at para. 52. 
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The second section will be devoted to the codification of human 
rights in the flexible, merely material, written constitutional law 
that, here in Canada, we also call “quasi-constitutional” law. The 
third section will focus on the influence of supranational law con-
cerning human rights on Canada’s unwritten formal constitutional 
law, an influence which, as we will see, is akin to the influence of 
a material source of law. The fourth and final section of this report 
will briefly consider the modalities of judicial enforcement of the 
various procedural and substantive constitutional protections that 
Canadian law grants to human rights. 
 
1. FORMAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION: THE CA-
NADIAN CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF ABORIGINAL 
PEOPLES (PARTS I AND II OF THE CONSTITUTION 
ACT, 1982) 
 
1.1. Benefit of Rights 
 
1.1.1. According to the Charter 
 
It is necessary to situate the Charter properly with respect 
to the other charters and instruments protecting human rights 
and freedoms in Canada. Section 26 of the Charter, in this regard, 
preserves “any other rights or freedoms”, which are not to be 
taken away by the ones the Charter protects. What first and fore-
most distinguishes the Charter from other legislation of similar 
content is its full and formal constitutional status. Because of this 
status, it applies to both federal and provincial spheres of power in 
order to set the conditions of validity of various norms and ac-
tions. It only applies, however, to relations of the state with natu-
ral and legal persons. The constitutional Charter enforcement 
takes place in the same “decentralized” and “unspecialized” fash-
ion as all other Canadian constitutional law in the formal sense, 
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and not, even concurrently or partially, by the intervention of bod-
ies specifically created for this purpose.9 
 
Most often, rights and freedoms protected by the Charter 
belong to “everyone”, that is to say, to every natural and legal per-
sons, whether nationals or foreign citizens.10 
 
Some rights are, however, expressly intended for Canadian 
citizens only. Such is the case for the right to vote and to be 
elected (the democratic rights), the right to enter, remain in or 
leave Canada (the mobility rights), and the right to have one’s 
children receive instruction in the official language of the minority 
(section 3, subsection 6(1) and section 23). The extent of the right 
to move and gain livelihood in any province (subsection 6(2)) is 
slightly broader as it is explicitly granted to Canadian citizens and 
permanent residents. 
 
Due to their material content, some Charter rights are only 
applicable to natural persons. First of all, as only a natural person 
may obtain the status of citizen or permanent resident, the rights 
and freedoms reserved to the holders of these statutes can only be 
bestowed upon natural persons. 
 
A legal person can neither be granted freedom of conscience 
and religion (paragraph 2(a)),11 nor the right to only be deprived of 
life, liberty and security of its person in accordance with the prin-
ciples of fundamental justice (section 7).12 The same applies for 
                                                 
9.  See M. ST-HILAIRE & L. BICH-CARRIÈRE, supra note 1 at para. 23-30; H. 
JEAN & G. LAPORTE, “Contentieux constitutionnel”, loose-leaf ed., JurisClasseur 
Québec, coll. “Droit public”, Droit constitutionnel, Montréal, LexisNexis Canada, 
2011. 
10.  See Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145 [Southam]; Singh v. 
Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177 [Singh]. 
11.  See R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295 [Big M Drug Mart]. 
12.  See Singh, supra note 10; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (A.G.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 
927 at 1004; Dywidag Systems International, Canada Ltd. v. Zutphen Brothers 
Construction Ltd., [1990] 1 S.C.R. 705 [Dywidag] at 709; Canadian Egg Market-
ing Agency v. Richardson, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 157 [Richardson] at para. 36. 
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the protection against arbitrary detention and imprisonment (sec-
tion 9) and the rights in the event of arrest or detention (para-
graph 10(a) to (c)).  
 
As for the rights conceded to “any person charged with an 
offence”, even if the expression in itself can embrace legal persons 
as well as natural ones, the very nature of some of these rights will 
exclude legal persons from their application. It will be so when 
they are related to imprisonment or testimonies, for legal persons 
can, physically, neither be imprisoned nor testify (this applies to 
paragraphs 11(c),13 (e) and (f),14 among others).  
 
Likewise, the right of “a witness” not to have any evidence 
given in a proceeding used to incriminate that witness in another 
proceeding (section 13) and the right of “a party or witness” to the 
assistance of an interpreter (section 14) are reserved to natural 
persons. 
 
In contrast, the nature of certain rights allows legal persons 
to invoke them. This is true for the freedom of expression and the 
freedom of the press, and presumably also for the freedom of 
“other media of communication” (paragraph 2(b)).15 Section 8 ap-
pears to apply to legal persons in order to protect them against 
unreasonable search or seizure.16 
 
The issues pertaining to the protection against discrimina-
tion, or the right to equality, have yet to receive a definite remedy 
from the Supreme Court,17 although the transcripts of the debates 
                                                 
13.  See British Columbia Securities Commission v. Branch, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 
3; R. v. Amway corp., [1989] 1 S.C.R. 21. 
14.  See Richardson, supra note 12 at para. 36 (Iacobucci and Bastarache JJ., 
majority reasons). 
15.  See Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (A.G.), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 [Edmonton 
Journal]; Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v. Lessard, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 421. 
16.  See Southam, supra note 10. 
17.  See Edmonton journal, supra note 15, in which the dissenting judges, 
alone to speak of this matter, held that section 15 does not apply to legal per-
sons. See also Rudolph Wolff & Co. v. Canada, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 695 and Dywidag, 
supra note 12. 
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suggest that the framers of the Constitution did not intend for it to 
apply to legal persons. This debate has raised many concerns. For 
instance, a foreign legal person could attempt to allege a discrimi-
natory differential treatment based on national origin, an enumer-
ated ground of subsection 15(1). This could amount to trying to 
make Canadian constitutional law contribute to the implementa-
tion into domestic law of principles from international economic 
law, namely, those of the most-favoured-nation and of national 
treatment. Furthermore, the enumeration of grounds in subsec-
tion 15(1) is not exhaustive, which means a legal person could 
very well try to invoke this provision against a differential treat-
ment based on provincial origin or residence.18 
 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, legal persons have standing 
as of right to raise as a defence any right protected by the Charter, 
whether in criminal19 or in civil proceedings,20 and whether that 
right is bestowed upon them or not. To do so, however, the pro-
ceedings must have been initiated by the state or by one of its 
bodies, pursuant to a regulatory regime. This will always be the 
case in criminal proceedings, but not in civil ones. Under these 
circumstances, legal persons have standing to act as of right, and 
do not need to be granted public interest standing. At first, this 
exception was recognized to apply to criminal proceedings, with 
Big M Drug Mart in 1985. In this case, the Supreme Court stated 
that “[a]ny accused, whether corporate or individual, may defend a 
criminal charge by arguing that the law under which the charge is 
brought is constitutionally invalid”. 21  While the exception then 
seemed to be limited to criminal proceedings, its expansion to the 
broader context of penal proceedings was soon to be recognized by 
the case law. 22 A new widening, this time in the context of a civil 
                                                 
18.  The Supreme Court has yet to decide if provincial residence is an analog-
ous ground to those enumerated in subsection 15(1). See Richardson, supra note 
12 at para. 28, 60. 
19.  See Big M Drug Mart, supra note 11; R. v. Wholesale Travel Group Inc., 
[1991] 3 S.C.R. 154 [Wholesale Travel]. 
20.  See Richardson, supra note 12. 
21.  Big M Drug Mart, supra note 11 at para. 39. 
22.  See Wholesale Travel, supra note 19, which confirms it. 
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proceeding, happened in Canadian Egg Marketing Agency v. 
Richardson: 
 
In our opinion, the logic of Big M Drug Mart extends to 
give standing as of right to the respondents.  While they 
might seek public interest standing, we do not believe they 
need do so.  They do not come before the court voluntarily. 
They have been put in jeopardy by a state organ bringing 
them before the court by an application for an injunction 
calling in aid a regulatory regime.  Success of that applica-
tion could result in enforcement by contempt proceedings. 
If the foundation for these remedies is an unconstitutional 
law, it appears extraordinary that a defendant cannot be 
heard to raise its unconstitutionality solely because the 
constitutional provision which renders it invalid does not 
apply to a corporation. 
[...] Surely, just as no one should be convicted of an of-
fence under an unconstitutional law, no one should be the 
subject of coercive proceedings and sanctions authorized 
by an unconstitutional law.23 
 
A legal person will thus be able to benefit from a finding of 
unconstitutionality even when such a finding results from the vio-
lation of human beings’ rights or freedoms. 
 
If the “Big M Drug Mart exception” does not apply, a person, 
whether legal or natural, can seek public interest standing. Such a 
standing will be granted if the person seeking it establishes that 
there is a serious issue raised as to the invalidity of legislation, 
that he is directly affected by the legislation or has a genuine in-
terest in its validity, and that the means chosen is a reasonable 
and effective way to bring the issue before the court.24 This doc-
trine has been developed by the case law to make sure a legal 
norm could never be immunized from judicial review.25 
                                                 
23.  Richardson, supra note 12 at para. 40, 44. 
24.  Canada (Attorney General) v. Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United 
Against Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45 [Downtown Eastside]. 
25.  We can see it as a greater effectuation, in practical terms, of the maxim 
ubi jus ibi remedium. See Hy and Zel's Inc. v. Ontario (A.G.); Paul Magder Furs 
Ltd. v. Ontario (A.G.), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 675 at 689; Canada (Minister of Justice) v. 
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1.1.2. According to Part II of the C.A. 1982 
 
Formal constitutionalisation of the special rights of Aborigi-
nal peoples is laudable, but unfortunately it is extremely uncom-
mon. A comprehensive discussion of its terms and merits in 
Canadian law is however beyond the scope of this report.26 
 
Part II of the C.A. 1982 provides for the following in its Sec-
tion 35: 
 
(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal 
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed. 
(2) In this Act, “aboriginal peoples of Canada” includes the In-
dian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada. 
(3) For greater certainty, in subsection (1) “treaty rights” in-
cludes rights that now exist by way of land claims agreements 
or may be so acquired.  
(4) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, the abo-
riginal and treaty rights referred to in subsection (1) are guar-
anteed equally to male and female persons. 
 
This recognition and affirmation pertains to two distinct 
sets of rights: aboriginal rights, including inter alia “activity rights” 
and aboriginal title, and treaty rights. The use of the term “exist-
ing” in subsection 35(1), C.A. 1982 means nothing more than the 
fact that “extinguished rights are not revived by the Constitution 
Act, 1982”.27 
 
Whereas the content of an “activity right” is the right to en-
gage in an activity that may or may not be tied to a territory, abo-
                                                 
Borowski, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 575 at 598; Nova Scotia Board of Censors v. McNeil, 
[1976] 2 S.C.R. 265 at 271; Thorson v. Canada (A.G.), [1975] 1 S.C.R. 138 at 
161-163; Downtown Eastside, supra note 24. 
26.  See generally Jean LECLAIR & Michel MORIN, “Peuples autochtones et droit 
constitutionnel” in Droit constitutionnel, loose-leaf ed., JurisClasseur Québec, 
coll. “Droit public”, Montréal, LexisNexis, 2011; Sébastien GRAMMOND, Aménager 
la coexistence : les peuples autochtones et le droit canadien, Bruylant/Yvon Blais, 
2003. 
27.  See R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [Sparrow]. 
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riginal title, as the most complete territorial aboriginal right, is a 
title recognizing rights of exclusive use and occupation on a global 
land space: 
 
[TRANSLATION] Aboriginal title rests in principle on a 
global land space, which means that it extends to mining 
rights and can encompass stream beds and water rights. 
Hence, aboriginal title differs, in Quebec at least, from pri-
vate ownership of land, which is subject in a large number 
of cases to the principle that rights in or over mineral sub-
stances form part of the domain of the state. The possibil-
ity that the aboriginal title is also a burden on some 
maritime spaces cannot be ruled out [...].28 
 
Any aboriginal right is likely to encompass a collective di-
mension. In Sappier/Gray, the Supreme Court explained that be-
cause those rights were recognized and affirmed “in order to assist 
in ensuring the continued existence of these particular aboriginal 
societies” and in maintaining their distinctive character, their ex-
ercise must be tied to this purpose. These rights are not “to be 
exercised by any member of the aboriginal community independ-
ently of the aboriginal society it is meant to preserve”.29  
 
In this sense, both the aboriginal title and the ancestral 
“activity rights” are collective rights held by the community and 
they suppose the ability for that community to allocate the terms 
of individual exercise thereof.30 The same is true for treaty rights. 
In fact, Sébastien Grammond describes a treaty as an “[TRANSLA-
TION] agreement which pertains to the rights of an Aboriginal 
people as a people, that is to say, to its collective rights”.31 
                                                 
28.  Ghislain OTIS, “Le titre aborigène : émergence d’une figure nouvelle et 
durable du foncier autochtone?”, (2005) 46 Les Cahiers de Droit 795 at 838. 
29.  R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686 at para. 26. 
30.  See Sparrow, supra note 27 at 1112; Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Ap-
peals Commission), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585 at para. 36; R. v. Powley, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 
207 [Powley] at para. 24; Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 
[Delgamuukw] at para. 115. 
31.  S. GRAMMOND, Aménager la coexistence, supra note 26 at 251; S. GRAM-
MOND, Les traités entre l’État canadien et les peuples autochtones, Cowansville, 
Yvon Blais, 1996 at 85-86. 
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These “collective” rights, whether aboriginal or treaty rights, 
can however be enforced on a contentious basis by an individual, 
including (but not limited to) as a defence in criminal proceed-
ings.32 In Powley, the Supreme Court confirmed that even if abo-
riginal rights are communal rights “grounded in the existence of a 
historic and present community”, they may be exercised provided 
that it is “by virtue of an individual’s ancestrally based member-
ship in the present community”.33 Recognition of the community 
by ordinary law is, therefore, in no way decisive.  
 
1.2. Burden of Rights 
 
1.2.1. According to the Charter 
 
We have seen the conditions under which it is possible for a 
party (or an intervener) to benefit from a Charter right, but it is 
also necessary, at least in theory, that the author of the impugned 
measure be bound by the Charter. To that effect, subsection 32(1) 
states that the Charter applies: 
 
(a) to the Parliament and government of Canada in respect 
of all matters within the authority of Parliament including 
all matters relating to the Yukon Territory and Northwest 
Territories; and  
(b) to the legislature and government of each province in 
respect of all matters within the authority of the legisla-
ture of each province. 
 
In short, the Charter applies to the federal and provincial 
legislators and governments in their respective areas of jurisdiction. 
Its application takes into account the federative form of state or-
ganization. 
 
Case law relating to the burden of rights under the Charter 
is not without its ambiguities, to the point that credit can be given 
                                                 
32.  See Sparrow, supra note 27. 
33.  Powley, supra note 30 at para. 24. 
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to the thesis of a discrepancy between the Supreme Court’s “the-
ory” and its actual practice. Since an exhaustive description of 
these inconsistencies goes beyond the scope of this report, the 
following is only a summary of the Supreme Court’s dominant po-
sition as to the various aspects of the Charter application. Apart 
from exceptional cases, there would seem to be two main modes of 
application of the Charter to the actors identified in subsection 
32(1): in accordance with the impugned measure’s “legislative” 
nature, or in accordance with its “governmental” nature. 
 
1.2.1.1. The Burden of the Legislator 
 
The Charter applies, in theory, to the federal Parliament and 
the provincial legislatures taken as a whole, as well as to the ele-
ments of which they are composed (the House of Commons and 
the Senate, and the provincial legislative assemblies, inter alia). 
 
Insofar as it applies to the legislator, the Charter applies, 
first, to any legislative or regulatory norm. It thus allows courts, 
by reading in or reading down, to add or to subtract from the lan-
guage of an impugned statute in order to construe it as consistent 
with the rights protected by the Charter.34 However, the Charter 
cannot be a basis to declare complete legislative silence on an is-
sue unconstitutional. 
 
A legislative norm is not to be held contrary to the Charter 
when this norm merely confers, in full equality, an ability, such as 
the ability to enter into a contract, if exercising this ability does 
not necessarily involve an infringement to a person’s constitu-
tional rights. This is the concept of neutral legislative standard. 
The core of this analysis is to determine if the alleged breach of 
the Charter stems from the standard itself or rather from its im-
plementation. For instance, in Young v. Young35  and P. (D.) v. 
S. (C.),36 rendered at the same time, a unanimous Supreme Court 
held that the legislative provisions making the “best interest of the 
                                                 
34.  See Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 [Vriend] at para. 44. 
35.  Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3. 
36.  P.(D.) v. S.(C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141. 
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child” the guiding criterion for the Court in its adjudication of dis-
putes regarding custody do not, in themselves, infringe any right 
or freedom protected by the Charter.37 
 
When the alleged breach of the Charter is attributable to an 
act of implementation of a legislative norm, the Charter will only 
be applicable to it, insofar as it applies to the legislator, if the ac-
tion is taken under statutory authority granted by the norm in 
question. Such authority is, by definition, a power that derogates 
from the rules of law of general application and that can only be 
bestowed by statutory or common law. The Charter will not apply, 
in this mode, to the exercise of a mere ability conferred by general 
law, for instance provided by the Civil code, or existing only 
through a statute incorporating an association. Hence, an arbitra-
tion process arising under a contractual stipulation will not be 
subject to the Charter, while an arbitration that is imposed by 
statute, such as grievance arbitration, will be.38 To take another 
example, the exercise of its jurisdiction by the British Columbia 
Human Rights Commission was easily recognized as subject to the 
Charter in Blencoe: 
 
One distinctive feature of actions taken under statutory 
authority is that they involve a power of compulsion not 
possessed by private individuals (P. W. Hogg, Constitu-
tional Law of Canada (loose-leaf ed.), vol. 2, at p. 34-12).  
Clearly the Commission possesses more extensive powers 
than a natural person. The Commission’s authority is not 
derived from the consent of the parties.  The Human 
Rights Code grants various powers to the Commission to 
both investigate complaints and decide how to deal with 
such complaints. Section 24 of the Code specifically allows 
the Commissioner to compel the production of docu-
ments.39 
                                                 
37.  See contra Miron v. Trudel, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 418. The Ontarian insurance 
act was infringing section 15 right to equality by limiting the notion of  “spouse” 
to legally married spouses. 
38.  Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038 [Slaight]. 
39.  Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), [2000] 2 
S.C.R. 307 [Blencoe] at para.  36 (Bastarache J.). 
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As Peter Hogg points out, however, the Supreme Court 
sometimes departs from its own principle.40 This issue has given 
rise to many controversies in the jurisprudence and among schol-
ars. Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court has, at times, held 
the Charter to be binding upon a form of implementation that was 
in no way tantamount to the exercise of statutory authority.41 
Thereby, it seemingly introduced a concept of “implementation of 
government policy” in the analysis, thereby confusing the two 
main modes of application of the Charter. 
 
1.2.1.2. The Burden of the Government 
 
Insofar as it applies to the government, the Charter applies 
to an action by virtue only of the “governmental” quality of its au-
thor, regardless of the nature of the action. It is of no importance 
whether the action was taken under prerogative powers42 or under 
common law powers; nor does it matter that it consists in exercis-
ing a mere general ability deriving from the Civil code, the com-
mon law or a statute. This can include entering into a contract or 
into any kind of bilateral act,43 or the exercise of property rights. 
The Charter will apply as long as the author of the action is 
deemed equivalent to the government in the strict meaning of the 
term, the meaning that refer to the holder of the executive power. 
Thus, in Canada, this includes the Queen or the Governor General 
in Council, or the Lieutenant Governor in Council, depending on 
whether the federal or a provincial government is at issue.44 The 
                                                 
40.  Peter W. HOGG, Constitutional Law of Canada, 5th ed. supp., loose-leaf 
ed., Toronto, Carswell, 2007 at 37-15 to 37-18. 
41.  See Eldridge v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 624 at para. 43-51. The 
implementation by a hospital of a “determined policy” or “program” offering ser-
vices that residents of the province were entitled to receive, and the hospitals 
obligated to offer, was subject to the Charter, even though pursuant to the law 
the hospital was not exercising any power over others in supplying hospital care 
and other medical services. 
42.  See Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441. 
43.  See Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association v. Douglas College, [1990] 3 
S.C.R. 570 [Douglas]. 
44.  Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 5, s. 9-16, 58-68. 
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Charter will also apply in this way to any action taken by the 
“cabinet” (at law, it is in reality the Committee of the Queen’s Privy 
Council for Canada) or the Executive Council alone, depending on 
whether the federal or provincial power is at issue, and to any ac-
tion taken by individual ministers or by public servants of the gov-
ernment in the strict sense.  
 
Therewith, any legal or natural person or entity designated 
by statute as a Crown agent45 or deemed so after the analysis of a 
statute 46  will be bound by the Charter in the same way. This 
analysis may take two forms: a structural analysis, or a functional 
analysis. Both have given rise to a plentiful and sometimes con-
flicting jurisprudence. 
 
In essence, structural analysis will lead to the conclusion 
that an entity is a Crown agent if a substantial degree of control 
held by the government (in the strict meaning) over the entity is 
revealed. Such an analysis will have to rest on the entity’s legisla-
tive regime in its entirety, in order to determine the method of ap-
pointment and dismissal of its directors and officers, and to verify 
the extent to which its regulations and rulings are subject to gov-
ernmental or ministerial approval, among other things. Various 
other kinds of governmental interference in the entity’s operation 
could also be considered. Public funding should not, however, be 
decisive in itself. 
 
While in some respects structural analysis reduces the no-
tion of governmental function to a narrow conception of govern-
ment, functional analysis, to the contrary, derives from a broader 
concept of public service. Functional analysis focuses on the na-
ture of the entity’s main operations or activities, in order to deter-
                                                 
45.  See Greater Vancouver Transportation Authority v. Canadian Federation 
of Students — British Columbia Component, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 295 [Greater Van-
couver] at para. 17 (Deschamps J.). For instance, section 3.1.1. of the Hydro-
Québec Act, R.S.Q. c. H-5, provides that “[t]he Company, for the purposes of this 
Act, is, and has been ever since 14 April 1944, a mandatary of the State”. 
46.  See Douglas, supra note 43; Lavigne v. Ontario Public Service Employees 
Union, [1991] 2 S.C.R. 211 [OPSEU]. 
The Codification 
522 of Human Rights (2012) 42 R.D.U.S. 
 in Canada 
 
 
 
mine if they correspond to the performance of a governmental 
function. 
 
Structural analysis is the prevailing view since the Supreme 
Court’s decisions in McKinney v. University of Guelph and Stoffman 
v. Vancouver General Hospital, rendered by a majority per Justice 
LaForest.47 Nonetheless, this approach, which can be qualified as 
exclusivist “structuralism”, has faced many criticisms, even within 
the Supreme Court itself.48 Despite the structural analysis’ domi-
nant position, we believe that the Supreme Court’s actual practice 
attests to the implicit and unassumed influence of a broad con-
ception of governmental function understood from the perspective 
of public service, and not solely of the quality of the actors. This 
more general conception extends not only to the actions of actors 
that are not in essence governmental, but also to the implementa-
tion of statutes, and even to the adoption of statutes. At this level 
of generality, it comprises the performance of a jurisdictional func-
tion as well.49 
In Buhay, Justice Arbour, on behalf of a unanimous court, 
stated in obiter dictum that “[i]t may be that if the state were to 
abandon in whole or in part an essential public function to the 
                                                 
47.  McKinney v. University of Guelph, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 [McKinney] and 
Stoffman v. Vancouver General Hospital, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 483 [Stoffman]. This 
position was followed in Douglas, supra note 43 and OPSEU, supra note 46. 
48.  See McKinney, supra note 47 (j. Wilson, dissenting reasons; Lexum un-
paginated electronic version). 
49.  This view has been confirmed by Greater Vancouver, supra note 45 at 
para. 16 (Deschamps J.). Unanimously, the Supreme Court distinguished and 
admitted, besides the structural analysis, two forms of functional analysis: the 
one of the nature of the entity, and the one of the nature of the entity’s impugned 
activities. See also Godbout v. Longueuil (City), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, in which the 
minority, per LaForest J., deemed the Charter applicable to the City of Longueuil 
because of the governmental nature of its activities, or at least, of the impugned 
activities. It seems that Justice LaForest thus tried to correct, without admitting 
it and by way of a rather forced interpretative reconstruction, the mistake made 
in the majority reasons of McKinney, supra note 47 and Stoffman, supra note 47. 
On the other hand, majority reasons suggested that, without a sufficient degree 
of governmental control, the application of the Charter insofar as it applies to the 
government should be strictly limited to the entity’s performance of governmental 
functions.  
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private sector, even without an express delegation, the private ac-
tivity could be assimilated to that of a state actor for Charter pur-
poses”.50 Consequently, even when an entity is neither designated 
as a Crown agent nor deemed to be so by virtue of the govern-
ments' s control over it, the Charter will apply  (insofar as it ap-
plies to the government), though only to the exercise of the 
functions in question. 
 
Our thesis can be contrasted with the reasoning based on 
the exclusive application of a structural method justifying a very 
restricted view of the concept of government, which seems to be 
founded on some blindness towards the reality of a state interven-
tion that diversified its forms and underwent a general expansion 
during the course of the 20th century. This reasoning favours the 
application of the Charter to a government conceived restrictively, 
on the basis of the form it may have taken in a bygone era, 
whereas a constitutional charter effectiveness in protecting rights 
and freedoms precisely demands that a state’s actions be reviewed 
in an evolutionary perspective, adaptable to the society in which it 
takes place. This is how Justice Wilson was justified in making the 
following observation, which concludes our remarks on this issue: 
 
It seems to me that a historical review of the growth of the 
Canadian state makes clear that those who enacted the 
Charter were concerned to provide some protection for in-
dividual freedom and personal autonomy in the face of 
government's expanding role. […] In my view, it follows 
from these propositions that we must take a broad view of 
the meaning of the term “government”, one that is sensi-
tive both to the variety of roles that government has come 
to play in our society and to the need to ensure that in all 
of these roles it abides by the constitutional norms set out 
in the Charter. This means that one must not be quick to 
assume that a body is not part of government. Considera-
tion of a wide range of factors may well be necessary be-
fore one can conclude definitively that a particular entity 
is not part of government.  If this Court is to discharge its 
responsibility of ensuring that our constitution does pro-
                                                 
50.   R. v. Buhay, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 631 at para. 31. 
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vide “unremitting protection of individual rights and liber-
ties” against government action, then it must not take a 
narrow view of what government action is. To do so is to 
limit the impact of the Charter and minimize the protec-
tion it was intended to provide.51 
 
Regarding the application of the Charter to local govern-
ment bodies, it is likely that, even if the Supreme Court has never 
held so in ratio decidendi, all cities, municipalities, regional mu-
nicipalities, urban communities and districts’ actions are already 
in the purview of the Charter.52 As for schools, the Supreme Court 
has held that “schools constitute part of government” for the ap-
plication of the Charter.53 This governmental status (by function) 
was given to elementary and secondary schools, but colleges and 
universities were not mentioned.54 
 
There seems to be an exception to these principles that are 
supposed to guide the Charter’s application to the government: 
police officers. Their action is apparently always considered as 
governmental. In Broyles, police officers were unanimously con-
sidered to be bound by the Charter, and the Supreme Court 
merely referred to them generally as “agent[s] of the state”,55 with-
                                                 
51.  McKinney, supra note 47 (Wilson J., dissenting reasons; Lexum unpagi-
nated electronic version). 
52.  See Greater Vancouver, supra note 45 at para. 22 (Deschamps J.): “a 
government should not be able to shirk its Charter obligations by simply confer-
ring its powers on another entity. The creation of TransLink by statute in 1998 
and the partial vesting by the province of control over the region’s public transit 
system in the [Greater Vancouver Regional District] was not a move towards the 
privatization of transit services, but an administrative restructuring designed to 
place more power in the hands of local governments. The devolution of provincial 
responsibilities for public transit to the [Greater Vancouver Regional District] 
cannot therefore be viewed as having created a “Charter   free” zone for the public 
transit system in Greater Vancouver” (references omitted). 
53.  R. v. M. (M.R.), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 393 [M.R.M.] at para. 25 (Cory J., majority 
reasons). This general conclusion of the majority was shared by the dissenting 
judge at para. 71 (Major J., dissenting reasons). 
54.  Ibid. at para. 64 (Cory J., majority reasons). 
55.  R. v. Broyles, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 595 (Iacobucci J.; Lexum unpaginated elec-
tronic version). 
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out ever mentioning subsection 32(1). 56  Similarly, in Hape, no 
judge opposed the general proposition that police officers, for the 
purpose of the Charter, must be considered as a “state actor” or 
“agent of the state”. This tends to confirm the presence of an im-
plicit, albeit more effective, principle of application of the Charter 
to any performance of a governmental function, in the broad pub-
lic service meaning of the term. 
 
The application of the Charter to courts, for its part, has 
given rise to a heated and mostly unresolved debate among com-
mentators and judges. Suffice it to say that although refuted at 
first by the Supreme Court, the theory of applicability seems in-
creasingly recognized, whether as applying to the government or to 
the legislator (since the adjudicating power of the courts derives 
from or is continued by statute).57 In addition, many legal rights 
recognized to any person charged with an offence require, by their 
very content, that the decisions of the courts be subject to Charter 
review.58 
1.2.2. According to Part II of the C.A. 1982 
 
Discussing the burden of rights under Part II of the C.A. 
1982 cannot be done without presenting a portrait of Canadian 
federalism. 
 
At the time of the federation of British North American 
colonies in 1867, the legislative power over “Indians, and Lands 
reserved for the Indians” was attributed by the imperial legislator 
to the colonial central sphere of jurisdiction, by way of subsection 
91(24) of the C.A. 1867. Before 1867, executive and legislative 
powers were allocated between the Empire and the colonies. The 
                                                 
56.  See also R. v. Cook, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 597 at para. 124 (Bastarache J., 
concurring reasons), echoed by R. v. Hape, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 292 [Hape] at para. 
103 (LeBel J., majority reasons) to support the more restrictive idea that, at least, 
police officers “are clearly government actors to whom, prima facie, the Charter 
would apply”. 
57.  For the thesis that is does not apply, see RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., 
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 573 [Dolphin Delivery]. For the thesis that it applies, see R. v. 
Rahey, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588 [Rahey]. 
58.  On this matter, see Hogg, supra note 40 at 37-20 to 37-22.  
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Empire retained full control over this allocation, so that it was not 
federalism, but “decentralization” towards the colonies. Legislative 
power over the Aboriginals, from 1750, was tied to what we nowa-
days call the Defence. It then became a jurisdiction of its own. In 
1860, as soon as the Imperial Parliament approved the colonial 
law entitled An Act respecting the Management of the Indian Lands 
and Property, the United Province of Canada (which would later be 
divided into two federated provinces, Ontario and Quebec, pursu-
ant to section 6 of the C.A. 1867) was granted competence over 
Aboriginal Affairs.59 Seven years later, the legislative powers, until 
then delegated by the Empire to the colonies, had to be allocated 
as a result of the federation of some of the British North American 
colonies. This allocation was taking place between, on the one 
hand, the colonies that were becoming federate entities, and on 
the other hand, a new sphere of power, the federal power. At the 
level of the legal relationship between London and British North 
America, however, little had changed. The Empire was still the 
grand master behind colonial constitutions, and the competent 
power with respect to commerce and intercolonial, imperial and 
international relationships. 
 
The provision bestowing exclusive jurisdiction over Aborigi-
nal peoples upon the central power, subsection 91(24) of the C.A. 
1867, uses the word “Indians” only. In 1939, in the reference re-
lating to “Eskimos”,60 the Supreme Court unanimously held that 
the word “Indians”, in the context of this formal constitutional 
provision, includes the Inuits. In 1867, there were no Inuits in 
Canada, as they were living in Rupert’s Land and in Labrador, two 
territories that Canada acquired in 1870 and 1949, respectively. 
The transfer of Rupert’s Land from the Hudson’s Bay Company to 
the colony was meant to allow the expansion of some provinces’ 
frontiers, including Quebec, in 1898, and again in 1912. Since the 
expansion of Manitoba, Ontario and Quebec (in the last case, to 
encompass a territory inhabited by Inuits), the central power was 
refusing to recognize its jurisdiction (and responsibility) over 
                                                 
59.  An Act respecting the Management of the Indian Lands and Property, 
S.P.C. 1860, 23 Vict., c. 151. 
60.  Reference whether "Indians" includes "Eskimo", [1939] S.C.R. 104. 
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Inuits. It was alleging that according to subsection 91(24), its 
competence extended only to “Indians”, but the evidence was 
overwhelming: colonial authorities had always considered the 
Inuits as a category of “Indians”. It is thus established, since that 
1939 reference, that the federal power has constitutional jurisdic-
tion over Amerindians and Inuits.  
 
Meanwhile, the central power still refuses to recognize its 
jurisdiction over the Métis, even though some passages of the Es-
kimo reference clearly suggest that the central power has jurisdic-
tion over all Aboriginal peoples, and Part II of the C.A. 1982 
recognizes them as Aboriginal people. The Supreme Court has yet 
to pronounce on this issue. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal 
Peoples recommended an affirmative answer.61 Section 31 of the 
Manitoba Act, 1870, a statute which is part of the Constitution of 
Canada according to paragraph 52(2)b) of the C.A. 1982, recog-
nizes an “Indian title” to the “half-breed residents”.62 Nevertheless, 
in Blais in 2003, the Supreme Court held that the Métis were not 
“Indians” within the meaning of paragraph 13 of the Natural Re-
sources Transfer Agreement of Manitoba, incorporated as schedule 
1 to the Constitution Act, 1930, but, at the same time, emphasized 
that it “leave[s] open for another day the question of whether the 
term “Indians” in s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867 includes 
the Métis”.63 
 
It is critical, in this instance, to distinguish between consti-
tutional law and ordinary law. According to constitutional law, the 
central power has jurisdiction over the Inuits and Amerindians at 
least, while its jurisdiction over the Métis is uncertain. Still ac-
cording to the Constitution, “Lands reserved for the Indians” are 
not limited to reserves within the meaning of the Indian Act (the 
“I.A.”), but rather, encompass any land subject to an aboriginal 
                                                 
61.  Canada, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, Royal Commission 
Report on Aboriginal Peoples, Ottawa / Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
1996, vol. 5. 
62.  Manitoba Act, 1870, 33 Vict., c. 3 (Canada), s. 31. See also Manitoba Mé-
tis Federation Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), 2010 MBCA 71 (CanLII). 
63.  R. v. Blais, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 236 at para. 36. 
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title.64 As regards ordinary law, the federal legislator made the I.A. 
applicable only to “Indians” as defined in the I.A. itself, not in the 
constitutional sense of the term. The I.A. only applies to persons 
who are registered under it or entitled to be so registered, while 
provisions pertaining to registration only allow Amerindians to do 
so, to the exclusion of Inuits and Métis. The central power’s lim-
ited exercise of its jurisdiction over “Indians”, however, may not be 
taken as a basis to delimit its extent. Pending a satisfactory an-
swer, in Alberta, the Métis are regulated by a provincial statute, 
the Metis Settlements Act.65 Its constitutionality has recently been 
reviewed by the Supreme Court on Charter grounds (equality 
rights and fundamental freedoms), but not on division of powers 
grounds.66 
 
Federal legislative power over Aboriginals is rather broad. 
As long as a federal statute is aimed specifically at the Aboriginals, 
it will, in all likelihood, be upheld as valid. Conversely, any provin-
cial statute that addresses, on a non ancillary basis, Aboriginals 
qua Aboriginals, should normally be found to be invalid. Yet, nu-
merous provincial provisions pertaining to Aboriginals have been 
recognized as having a valid incidental effect on a matter within 
federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, in practice, courts tend to up-
hold provincial statutes relating specifically to Aboriginals, pro-
vided that they do not intend to define Aboriginals’ status or 
distinctiveness, or mainly purport to curtail their rights or to in-
flict special obligations on them.67 It thus seems even more likely 
that a provincial statute incidentally aiming toward the protection 
of aboriginal or treaty rights would be deemed valid. That is how, 
                                                 
64.  Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. See Delgamuukw, supra note 30 at 
para. 174-176; St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Co. v. the Queen, 
(1888) 14 A.C. 49 at 59. 
65.  Metis Settlements Act, R.S.A. 2000 c. M-14. 
66.  Alberta (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development) v. Cunningham, 
[2011] 2 S.C.R. 670. 
67.  R. v. Sutherland, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 451; Moosehunter v. R., [1981] 1 S.C.R. 
282; Dick v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 309; Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 950; 
Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, Tourism and Cul-
ture), [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146; Paul v. British Columbia (Forest Appeals Commis-
sion), [2003] 2 S.C.R. 585 [Paul]. 
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in Paul, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he province of British Co-
lumbia has legislative competence to endow an administrative tri-
bunal with the capacity to consider a question of aboriginal rights 
in the course of carrying out its valid provincial mandate”.68 All of 
which goes to say that the issue of the burden of rights correlate 
to the special rights of Aboriginal peoples cannot merely be re-
duced to the issue of legislative jurisdiction over “Indians”. 
 
Inasmuch as Aboriginal treaties are defined by their obliga-
tional content regarding the fundamental rights of an Aboriginal 
community as such, division of powers principles should lead us 
to the conclusion that only the federal government can be party to 
a treaty defining the status and rights of Aboriginals. In Howard, 
however, the Supreme Court oddly suggested that provinces could 
be competent to enter into aboriginal treaties addressing more 
than a cession of territory.69 This seems hard to reconcile with the 
Simon and Morris cases, in which treaty rights were held to fall 
under the federal jurisdiction over “Indians and Lands reserved for 
the Indians”.70  The aforementioned cases never anticipated the 
possibility of a treaty with the Métis, over whom the federal juris-
diction is uncertain. 
 
Treaty-making is a royal prerogative at common law; hence, 
to the question of which federal body or authority is competent to 
conclude treaties with Aboriginal communities, the answer is that 
it comes within the purview of the executive power, exercised 
through the minister. The treaty-making process is subject to very 
relaxed requirements, and even seems to do without conditions of 
form.71 The Supreme Court developed a doctrine on this matter 
that is analogous to the one pertaining to ostensible authority.72 
The minister may therefore engage the constitutional (and thus 
                                                 
68.  See Paul, supra note 67 at para. 46. 
69.  R. v. Howard, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 299 at 308. 
70.  Simon v. R., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 387 [Simon] at 411; R. v. Morris, [2006] 2 
S.C.R. 915 at para. 43 (majority reasons) and at para. 91 (dissenting reasons). 
71.  See Simon, supra note 70 at 400-401. 
72.  R. v. Sioui, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1025 at 1040. 
The Codification 
530 of Human Rights (2012) 42 R.D.U.S. 
 in Canada 
 
 
 
supra-legislative) responsibility of the state by entering into a 
treaty with an Aboriginal people. 
 
The duty to respect aboriginal and treaty rights of the Abo-
riginal peoples is incumbent upon the “Crown” (both provincial 
and federal), equivalent to what continental science of law calls 
the “state”. Indeed, in Van der Peet, the Supreme Court held that 
section 35 of the C.A. 1982’s purpose is “the reconciliation of the 
pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the 
Crown”. 73  In Haida Nation, the Supreme Court specified that 
“[t]his [normative] process of reconciliation flows from the Crown’s 
duty of honourable dealing toward Aboriginal peoples, which 
arises in turn from the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty over an 
Aboriginal people and de facto control of land and resources that 
were formerly in the control of that people”.74  
 
As for the duty to consult prior to the undertaking of ac-
tions that might adversely affect an Aboriginal right or title seri-
ously claimed, albeit not yet formally recognized and delimited, the 
Supreme Court confirmed in Haida Nation that the burden lies 
solely upon the Crown. 75  It thereby contradicted its previous 
statement in Delgamuukw, in which it suggested that this duty 
was also born by individuals. 
 
That being said, notwithstanding the constitutional rules of 
federalism, the obligation to respect Aboriginal peoples’ constitu-
tional rights, including the duty to consult, is binding mutatis mu-
tandis upon the provincial Crowns.76  Thereby, as long as they 
come to terms with the “Sparrow test”, provinces may curtail the 
exercise of such rights.77 
                                                 
73.  See R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at para. 31. 
74.  Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 
[Haida Nation] at para. 32. See also Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 at 
para. 9. 
75.  Haida Nation, supra note 74 at para. 35. 
76.  Haida Nation, supra note 74 at para. 35; Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier 
Sekani Tribal Council, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650. 
77.  See R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 at para. 87; Delgamuukw, supra note 
30 at para. 160. 
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It should be noted in passing that the content of the 
Crown’s duty to consult in Canadian constitutional law regarding 
Aboriginal peoples does not coincide perfectly with the interna-
tional law principle of the duty to obtain the free and informed 
consent of indigenous peoples as set out in article 32 of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.78 
 
1.3. Categories of Rights 
 
First, the Charter protects certain fundamental freedoms 
under its section 2: (a) “freedom of conscience and religion”; (b) 
“freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including 
freedom of the press and other media of communication”; (c) “free-
dom of peaceful assembly”; and (d) “freedom of association”. Com-
pared to the freedoms guaranteed by articles 9 to 11 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”)79 or by arti-
cles 18 to 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (the “ICCPR”),80 they have the same object, but not always 
the same content, according to the jurisprudence. Canadian case 
law on the freedoms of religion and of expression is plentiful. That 
relating to the freedom of association pertains mainly to collective 
labour relations, and is dauntingly unstable,81 while that relating 
to the freedom of peaceful assembly is, for all intents and pur-
poses, nonexistent. 
 
                                                 
78.  United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2 Octo-
ber 2007, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295. 
79.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms, 4 November 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 at 223, Eur. T.S. 5. 
80.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171, Can. T.S. 1976 No 47, 6 I.L.M. 289 (entered into force 23 
March 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976). 
81.  Reference Re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alta.), [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 313; Dunmore v. Ontario (A.G.), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 1016; Health Services and 
Support — Facilities Subsector Bargaining Association v. British Columbia, 
[2007] 2 S.C.R. 391 [Health Services]; Ontario (A.G.) v. Fraser, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3 
[Fraser]. 
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Then there are the “democratic rights” provided for by sec-
tions 3 to 5: the right for every citizen to vote and to be qualified to 
be elected in federal and provincial legislative elections (section 3), 
the setting of the maximum duration of federal and provincial leg-
islative bodies to five years, except under special circumstances 
(section 4), and the obligation for federal and provincial legislative 
bodies to hold a sitting at least once every twelve months (section 
5). Section 3 of the Charter has the same object than article 3 of 
the first Protocol to the ECHR and article 25 of the ICCPR. 
 
Section 6 of the Charter sets out the “mobility rights” of citi-
zens, who may enter, remain in and leave Canada, on the one 
hand (subsection 6(1)), and on the other hand, allows any citizen 
or permanent resident to move and gain livelihood anywhere in 
Canada (subsection 6(2)). Subsection 6(1) thus has the same ob-
ject as articles 2 and 3 of the Protocol no 4 to the ECHR and arti-
cles 12 and 13 of the ICCPR. 
 
It is followed by sections 7 to 14, bestowing legal rights 
which correspond in part to those of article 2 to 8 of the ECHR, of 
article 1 of its Protocol no 4, of its Protocol no 6, of article 4 of its 
Protocol no 7 and of its Protocol no 13. They also overlap the rights 
set out in articles 6 to 11, 14, 15 and 17 of the ICCPR. Section 7 of 
the Charter, a general protection of everyone’s right not to be de-
prived of life, liberty and security of the person, has been con-
structed by the Supreme Court in a broad and generous manner 
that extended its scope in such a way that it encompasses the 
freedom to make certain fundamental life choices.82 
 
Section 15 protects every individual’s right to equality by 
way of a general protection against negative discrimination (sub-
section 15(1)), while expressly allowing positive discrimination 
(subsection 15(2)), which is not required to be temporary.83 This 
                                                 
82.  New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), 
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 46 at para. 61; Blencoe, supra note 39; R. v. Malmo-Levine / R. 
v. Caine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571; R. v. Clay, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 735; Canada (A.G.) v. 
PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134. 
83.  R. v. Kapp, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 [Kapp]. 
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section thus has the same object as article 14 of the ECHR, its 
Protocol no 12 and articles 26 and 27 of the ICCPR. 
 
At last, sections 16 to 23 set out a set of linguistic rights re-
lating to Canada’s two official languages: English and French. 
 
It should be noted that, by virtue of section 33, federal and 
provincial legislators may derogate from the rights and freedoms 
provided for by sections 2 and 7 to 15 of the Charter. No material 
condition of urgency is required: in so doing, legislators only have 
to conform to purely formal conditions. In contrast, article 15 of 
the ECHR only allows derogation from rights that are not deemed 
“absolute” because of their utmost importance, such as the right 
to life (article 2, except for death resulting from lawful acts of war), 
the prohibition of torture and inhumane or degrading treatment 
(article 3), the prohibition of slavery and forced labour (article 4), 
and the protection against any punishment that is not provided 
for by law. Furthermore, derogatory measures may only be taken 
“in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation”, “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the 
situation”, and “provided that such measures are not inconsistent 
with [the state’s] other obligations under international law”. While 
article 4 of the ICCPR follows the same logic than the ECHR, the 
Constitution of Canada easily permits derogation not only from 
the fundamental freedoms and the equality rights, but also from 
legal rights, while it does not allow it for rights that are unques-
tionably more “relative”, such as the right to have one’s children 
educated in the official language of the minority (section 23). The 
foregoing tends to illustrate how the Constitution of Canada is at 
odds with international standards on this regard.84 
 
                                                 
84.  European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commis-
sion), Opinion on the protection of human rights in emergency situations, Opinion 
no. 359 / 2005, adopted at its 66th Plen. Sess., reported in press release CDL-
AD(2006)015, Strasbourg, 4 April 2006, online: 
<http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2006/CDL-AD(2006)015-e.pdf>. 
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Another specificity of the Charter is the presence, in section 
one, of a general restriction of rights clause, rather than particular 
provisions relating to the restriction of each specific right.85 
 
As for Part II of the C.A. 1982, we already explained how 
subsection 35(1) recognizes two main categories of rights for Abo-
riginal peoples: aboriginal rights, and treaty rights. The first cate-
gory encompasses “activity rights” and aboriginal title. According 
to subsection 35(3), the second category includes rights arising 
from the “modern treaties”, which are land claims agreements. 
 
1.4. The De Jure Absence of a Hierarchy of Rights 
 
It is a basic and uncontested principle of Canadian consti-
tutional law that, except for provisions laying out the constitution-
making power, “one [valid] part of the Constitution cannot be ab-
rogated or diminished by another part of the Constitution”.86 This 
principle, however unwritten on the whole, has been recognized by 
the courts, and partial written expressions of it can be found in 
the supreme law. For instance, the right to equality granted by 
section 15 of the Charter may not be invoked against the fact that 
the law may vary from a province to another, since this is a nor-
mal consequence of federalism as laid out by the C.A. 1982.87 Nei-
ther can the right to equality be invoked against the limited scope 
of the right to have one’s children educated in the language of the 
minority conferred by section 23 of the C.A. 1867.88 From the fore-
                                                 
85.  Marie DESCHAMPS, Maxime ST-HILAIRE & Pierre GEMSON, “The Cross-
Fertilisation of Jurisprudence and the Principle of Proportionality: Process and 
Result from a Canadian Perspective”, to be published. 
86.  See New Brunswick Broadcasting Co. v. Nova Scotia (Speaker of the 
House of Assembly), [1993] 1 S.C.R. 319 [N.B. Broadcasting] (McLachlin J., ma-
jority reasons, Lexum unpaginated electronic version); Reference re Bill 30, An 
Act to Amend the Education Act (Ont.), [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1148; Adler v. Ontario, 
[1996] 3 S.C.R. 609. 
87.  Gosselin (Tutor of) v. Quebec (A.G.), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 238 [Gosselin]. 
88.  The jurisprudence goes so far as to provide that “in a federal system, 
province-based distinctions do not automatically give rise to a presumption of 
discrimination”, and that “differential application of federal law in different prov-
inces can be a legitimate means of promoting and advancing the values of a fed-
eral system”: Haig v. Canada; Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] 2 
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going principle derives the principle of the absence of a hierarchy 
of constitutional rights and freedoms. 
 
This latter principle, which is also recognized in interna-
tional law pursuant to the Vienna Declaration of 199389 as a corol-
lary to the principle of the indivisibility of human rights, was first 
articulated in Canadian law by the Supreme Court in Dagenais v. 
Canadian Broadcasting Corp. in 1994: 
 
The pre-Charter common law rule governing publication 
bans emphasized the right to a fair trial over the free ex-
pression interests of those affected by the ban. In my view, 
the balance this rule strikes is inconsistent with the prin-
ciples of the Charter, and in particular, the equal status 
given by the Charter to ss. 2(b) and 11(d). It would be in-
appropriate for the courts to continue to apply a common 
law rule that automatically favoured the rights protected 
by s. 11(d) over those protected by s. 2(b). A hierarchical 
approach to rights, which places some over others, must 
be avoided, both when interpreting the Charter and when 
developing the common law. When the protected rights of 
two individuals come into conflict, as can occur in the 
case of publication bans, Charter principles require a bal-
ance to be achieved that fully respects the importance of 
both sets of rights. 90  
 
Courts have repeatedly confirmed the principle since.91 If 
two Charter rights seem to be at odds, a judge may not declare a 
general precedence of one over the other. He or she must strive to 
reconcile them in a way that will resolve the conflict, and if neces-
                                                 
S.C.R. 995 (L'Heureux-Dubé J., Lexum unpaginated electronic version), referring 
to R. v. S.(S), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 254. 
89.  Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N.G.A.O.R., 48th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157 (1993) 23. 
90.  Dagenais v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp., [1994] 3 S.C.R. 835 at 877 
(emphasis added). 
91.  See inter alia Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698 at 
para. 50; Gosselin, supra note 88; as cited by Louis-Philippe LAMPRON & Eugénie 
BROUILLET, “Le principe de non-hiérarchie entre droits et libertés fondamentaux : 
l’inaccessible étoile?”, (2011) 41 Revue générale de droit 93 at para. 2. 
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sary, will firmly anchor the decision to the facts of the case, or will 
take the latter right in consideration in the process of verifying if 
an infringement to the former right is justified in a free and de-
mocratic society, according to section one of the Charter.92 
 
It would however be illusory to believe that this principle 
could possibly be implemented in all its theoretical purity, and de 
facto hierarchies have established themselves within national legal 
regimes, despite the prohibition in principle under international 
law.93 
 
By looking at the overarching structure of the Charter, one 
can observe at first that section 33 suggests an odd hierarchy by 
allowing, as mentioned in section 1.3 of this report, a derogation 
from rights that are recognized by international standards and 
common sense as being of the utmost importance, but not from 
other rights of a manifest lesser importance. To our knowledge, 
this aberration stems from an unfortunate political and historical 
contingency, rather than strictly legal considerations.94 
 
Section 28 and subsection 35(4) of the C.A. 1982 turn gen-
der equality into an inviolable principle, a principle that adds to 
the general equality right of section 15 in order to assure equality 
in the protection of rights and freedoms offered by the Charter and 
in the protection of the special rights of Aboriginal peoples offered 
by Part II of the C.A. 1982, independently from the other provi-
sions of these instruments. Gender equality seems all the more to 
benefit from a special emphasis since section 33 of the Charter 
                                                 
92.  Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 825 at 
para. 73; Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 
[2001] 1 S.C.R. 772 at para. 29-35; Multani v. Commission scolaire Marguerite-
Bourgeoys, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 256 at para. 30; L.-P. LAMPRON & E. BROUILLET, supra 
note 91. 
93.  See Virginie SAINT-JAMES, “Hiérarchie et conciliation des droits de 
l’Homme” in Joël Andriantsimbazovina et al. eds., Dictionnaire des droits de 
l’Homme, Paris, P.U.F., 2008 at 477-478. 
94.  See Roy J. ROMANOW, John D. WHYTE & Howard A. LEESON, Canada… 
Notwithstanding: the making of the Constitution, 1976-1982, Toronto, Carswell / 
Methuen, 1984. 
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does not permit any derogation from section 28, and even less, if 
that is possible, from subsection 35(4), which is not part of the 
Charter. 
 
A delicate matter also arises regarding the interactions be-
tween the predominantly individual rights protected by the Char-
ter and the “collective” rights of Aboriginal peoples recognized and 
affirmed by Part II of the C.A. 1982. Section 25 of the Charter pro-
vides as follows: 
 
The guarantee in this Charter of certain rights and freedoms 
shall not be construed so as to abrogate or derogate from 
any aboriginal, treaty or other rights or freedoms that per-
tain to the aboriginal peoples of Canada including 
(a) any rights or freedoms that have been recognized by the 
Royal Proclamation of October 7, 1763; and  
(b) any rights or freedoms that now exist by way of land 
claims agreements or may be so acquired. 
 
To some extent, the principle according to which one part of 
the Constitution cannot abrogate or diminish another seems to 
manifest itself in this section. Up to now, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions on the matter have only comprised conflicting obiter 
dicta. In his partially concurring reasons in Kapp, Justice Basta-
rache suggested not only that Charter individual rights and free-
doms could not render invalid the special constitutional rights of 
Aboriginal peoples, but also that, according to the theory of the 
protective shield, the latter should systematically override the for-
mer.95 This runs directly counter to international law principles on 
these matters, which is why our preference is for Justice 
Deschamps partially concurring reasons in the recent Beckman 
case:  
 
In Reference re Secession of Quebec, 1998 CanLII 793 
(SCC), [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, at paras. 48  82, this Court 
identified four principles that underlie the whole of our 
constitution and of its evolution:  (1) constitutionalism 
                                                 
95.  Kapp, supra note 83 at para. 93-96 (Bastarache J., concurring reasons). 
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and the rule of law; (2) democracy; (3) respect for minority 
rights; and (4) federalism.  These four organizing princi-
ples are interwoven in three basic compacts:  (1) one be-
tween the Crown and individuals with respect to the 
individual’s fundamental rights and freedoms; (2) one be-
tween the non-Aboriginal population and Aboriginal peo-
ples with respect to Aboriginal rights and treaties with 
Aboriginal peoples; and (3) a “federal compact” between 
the provinces.  […] 
The Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples 
of Canada are recognized and affirmed in s. 35(1) of the 
Constitution Act, 1982.  The framers of the Constitution 
also considered it advisable to specify in s. 25 of that same 
Act that the guarantee of fundamental rights and free-
doms to persons and citizens must not be considered to be 
inherently incompatible with the recognition of special 
rights for Aboriginal peoples.  In other words, the first and 
second compacts should be interpreted not in a way that 
brings them into conflict with one another, but rather as 
being complementary. […]96 
 
1.5. The Exhaustivity Issue in Formal Constitutional 
Codification 
 
We will now turn to the relations between unwritten consti-
tutional principles and constitutional provisions protecting human 
rights. Some unwritten principles were recognized by the juris-
prudence as implied elements of the Constitution of Canada 
within the meaning of the C.A. 1982. 
 
The Constitution of Canada, like the constitutions of many 
other countries,97 is not only founded on, but also actually com-
                                                 
96.  Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103 
[Beckman] at para. 97-98 (Deschamps J., concurring reasons) (emphasis added).  
97.  Ronald M. DWORKIN, Law’s Empire, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University 
Press, 1986; Jeremy KIRK, “Constitutional Implications (I): Nature, Legitimacy, 
Classification, Examples”, (2000) 24 Melbourne University Law Review 645; “Con-
stitutional Implications (II): Doctrines of Equality and Democracy”, (2001) 25 
Melbourne University Law Review 24; Véronique CHAMPEIL-DESPLATS, Les principes 
fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République : Principes constitutionnels et 
justification dans les discours juridiques, Paris, Economica, 2001; Dieter GRIMM, 
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prises, underlying and unwritten principles that nonetheless con-
stitute rigid constitutional law. The Reference re Secession of Que-
bec, as aforementioned, rephrased some of the most important of 
these fundamental principles: constitutionalism and the rule of 
law; democracy; federalism; and respect for minority rights.98 The 
Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court had 
previously affirmed the existence of an unwritten, general and 
fundamental version of judicial independence.99 
 
Parliamentary privilege is a body of power and immunities 
(including to preserve the order of debates and to summon wit-
nesses) that common law and English law (in this instance, the 
Bill of Rights of 1689) traditionally bestowed upon parliamentari-
ans both individually and gathered in Chambers. It has also, in 
our opinion in a way as odd as it is perilous, been recognized as 
an underlying principle of the Constitution.100 
 
Finally, we must observe, as Justice Deschamps did in 
Beckman, that the honour of the Crown also holds a key position 
among these unwritten principles.101 
 
Care must be taken not to confuse these unwritten princi-
ples with constitutional conventions. The latter are part of the po-
litical Constitution’s structure, while the former are part of the 
legal constitution, formal and rigid. In the Reference re Secession 
of Quebec in 1998, the Supreme Court unanimously insisted on 
the following: 
 
Underlying constitutional principles may in certain cir-
cumstances give rise to substantive legal obligations (have 
                                                 
« The Basic Law at 60 – Identity and Change » 11 German Law Journal 33-46 
(2010), available at 
http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11artID=1230. 
98.  Secession of Quebec, supra note 4 at para. 48-82. 
99.  Reference re Remuneration of Judges of the Provincial Court of P.E.I.; 
Reference re Independence and Impartiality of Judges of the Provincial Court of 
P.E.I., [1997] 3 S.C.R. 3 [Remuneration of Judges] (Lamer C.J., majority reasons). 
100.  See N.B. Broadcasting, supra note 86. 
101.  Beckman, supra note 96 (Deschamps J., concurring reasons). 
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“full legal force”, as we described it in the Patriation Refer-
ence, supra, at p. 845[102]), which constitute substantive 
limitations upon government action. These principles may 
give rise to very abstract and general obligations, or they 
may be more specific and precise in nature. The principles 
are not merely descriptive, but are also invested with a 
powerful normative force, and are binding upon both 
courts and governments.103 
 
It remains to be determined how exactly an unwritten prin-
ciple can intervene in the judicial and, more generally, legal de-
bate, in order to produce such influential effects. These principles 
cannot do violence to the language of the supreme law they are 
meant to underlie and organize. The Supreme Court gave out this 
warning in the same 1998 case: 
 
Given the existence of these underlying constitutional 
principles, what use may the Court make of them? In the 
Provincial Judges Reference [...], we cautioned that the 
recognition of these constitutional principles [...] could not 
be taken as an invitation to dispense with the written text 
of the Constitution. On the contrary, we confirmed that 
there are compelling reasons to insist upon the primacy of 
our written constitution. A written constitution promotes 
legal certainty and predictability, and it provides a founda-
tion and a touchstone for the exercise of constitutional ju-
dicial review.104 
 
Rather, an unwritten principle may serve to inform the 
choice of a provision’s construction or to bridge the gaps in its 
language, as was the case in the reasons of the majority of the 
Supreme Court in the Reference re Remuneration of Judges in 
1997, wherein the intervention of the principle of independence of 
the judiciary was subsidiary.105 
 
                                                 
102.  Resolution to amend the Constitution, supra note 2. 
103.  Secession of Quebec, supra note 4 at para. 54. 
104.  Ibid. at para. 53. 
105.  See Remuneration of Judges, supra note 99 (Lamer C.J., majority rea-
sons). 
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Yet, as described in Dicey’s classic work,106 the rule of law 
shall at first be construed as referring to formal principles such as 
the publicity of the law and the submission of all, from the humble 
citizen to the head of the government, to a single legal regime en-
forced by a unified system of ordinary courts. It shall also, how-
ever, be interpreted as including a corpus of material subjective 
rights commonly called the “English liberties”. Insofar as this con-
ception is accurate, it was inevitable that whether the rule of law, 
as an unwritten constitutional principle, could come into play to 
fill potential gaps in the Charter’s provisions was a question that 
would arise before the Supreme Court. It so happened in 2005 
with the Imperial Tobacco case. The Supreme Court then unani-
mously reduced the formal (or rigid) constitutional version of the 
rule of law to only a few elements of its classic doctrinal purview. 
As a result, the Court concluded that it would do violence to the 
language of the Charter to see in it gaps that could be filled by the 
“English liberties” constituting the material aspect of the rule of 
law in its doctrinal conception.107 
 
The thesis that the Charter’s constitutional codification of 
human rights is exhaustive can only stand for the field of formal 
or rigid constitutional law. No one questions the validity of federal 
and provincial quasi-constitutional statutes on human rights. In-
deed, their validity is most likely confirmed by section 26 of the 
Charter, which provides that “[t]he guarantee in this Charter of 
certain rights and freedoms shall not be construed as denying the 
existence of any other rights or freedoms that exist in Canada”. 
Even when circumscribed to rigid constitutional law, however, this 
thesis must be balanced with that, prior to the Charter, of the im-
plied bill of rights. The idea that Canada’s rigid legal constitution 
includes an unwritten charter of fundamental rights goes back to 
a series of obiter dicta rendered over a period extending from 1938 
                                                 
106.  Albert Venn DICEY, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitu-
tion (1885), 10th ed., London, Macmillan, 1959. 
107.  British Columbia v. Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., [2005] 2 S.C.R. 473 at 
para. 58, 60, 65. 
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to 1997.108 Ironically enough, the last of these dicta is found in the 
Reference re Remuneration of Judges, the case on which the Su-
preme Court, one year after, relied upon to declare (in the Refer-
ence re Secession of Quebec) that an unwritten principle may not 
do violence to the written language of the Constitution. The irony 
is that it is this 1998 decision, hence indirectly the 1997 one, that 
would be the foundation of the Supreme Court when holding in 
Imperial Tobacco that the corpus of rights protected by the Charter 
was exhaustive of the rigid constitutional law on the matter. This 
divergence might be explained by the fact that the theory of the 
implied bill of rights only concerns the political freedom of expres-
sion, which it ties to the democratic structure of our parliamen-
tary institutions, that is to say, to the principle of democracy, and 
not to the principle of the rule of law. 
 
2. MATERIAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION: THE 
QUASI-CONSTITUTIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS STAT-
UTES 
 
Though “constitutional” in the material sense, the statutes 
that will be described in this section are ordinary statutes on the 
formal level. Their adoption is not an exercise of the constitution-
making power. Consequently, they cannot set out the conditions 
of validity of statutes. They usually benefit, however, from specific 
rules of precedence that depart from the general principles of con-
struction of statutes. In recognition of the importance of these 
statutes and their precedential status, the Supreme Court has 
                                                 
108.  Reference Re Alberta Statutes - The Bank Taxation Act; The Credit of 
Alberta Regulation Act; and the Accurante News and Information Act, [1938] 
S.C.R. 100 at 133-134 (Duff C.J.); Saumur v. Quebec (City), [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299 
at 331 (Rand J.), 353-354 (Kellock J.) and 363-374 (Locke J.); Switzman v. Elbing 
and Quebec (A.G.), [1957] S.C.R. 285 at 307 (Rand J.) and 328 (Abbott J.); Oil, 
Chemical and Atomic Workers, International Union, Local 16-601 v. Imperial Oil 
Ltd., [1963] S.C.R. 584 at 600 (Abbott J.); Fraser v. P.S.S.R.B., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 
455 at 462-463 (Dickson C.J.); OPSEU, supra note 46 at para. 39-44 (Dickson 
C.J., concurring reasons) and 143-152 (Beetz J., majority reasons); Dolphin Deli-
very, supra note 57 at 584 (McIntyre J.); Remuneration of Judges, supra note 99 
at para. 102-103 (Lamer C.J.). On this matter, see HOGG, supra note 40 at 34-10 
to 34-13. 
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dubbed them “quasi-constitutional”. According to the jurispru-
dence, this special status is gained by virtue of both their rules of 
precedence and their material content.109 Contrary to the Charter, 
these statutes apply to both private law and public law interac-
tions. Since they are ordinary statutes adopted in a federal sys-
tem, they can only protect rights and freedoms relating to the 
sphere of power of the legislator who enacted them. Most of these 
statutes are accompanied by a specialized and often optional im-
plementation mechanism. 
 
2.1. In Federal Law 
 
2.1.1. Laws of the Central Power 
 
There are two federal quasi-constitutional statutes protect-
ing human rights: the Canadian Bill of Rights of 1960110 (the “Ca-
nadian Bill”), and the Canadian Human Rights Act of 1977111 (the 
“Canadian Act”). 
 
The Canadian Bill protects rights and freedoms similar to 
those of the Charter. The former, however, in its paragraph 1(a), 
purports to protect the rights of individuals to enjoyment of prop-
erty, whereas the latter, on this regard, is limited to section 8 pro-
tection against unreasonable search or seizure. 
 
Section 2 of the Canadian Bill provides for construction di-
rectives and a precedence rule: 
 
Every law of Canada shall, unless it is expressly declared 
by an Act of the Parliament of Canada that it shall operate 
notwithstanding the Canadian Bill of Rights, be so con-
strued and applied as not to abrogate, abridge or infringe 
or to authorize the abrogation, abridgment or infringement 
                                                 
109.  Insurance Corporation of British Columbia v. Heerspink, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 
145; Ontario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd., 
[1985] 2 S.C.R. 536; Robichaud v. Canada (Treasury Board), [1987] 2 S.C.R. 84. 
110.  Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44. 
111.  Canadian Human Rights Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. 
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of any of the rights or freedoms herein recognized and de-
clared, and in particular, no law of Canada shall be con-
strued or applied so as to [do something prohibited by 
paragraph (a) to (g)]. 
 
As for the Canadian Act, its purpose is to ensure equal op-
portunities and to eliminate discrimination with respect to em-
ployers and service providers operating in the federal jurisdiction. 
It applies to both private relationships and relationships between 
the state and legal or natural persons, insofar as these relation-
ships pertain to the federal Parliament. Its subsection 66(1) pro-
vides that this act “is binding on Her Majesty in right of Canada, 
except in matters respecting the Yukon Government or the Gov-
ernment of the Northwest Territories or Nunavut”. 
 
It deals particularly with the right to protection against dis-
crimination. Its section 2 provides that its purpose is to give effect 
“to the principle that all individuals should have an opportunity 
equal with other individuals to make for themselves the lives that 
they are able and wish to have and to have their needs accommo-
dated, consistent with their duties and obligations as members of 
society, without being hindered in or prevented from doing so by 
discriminatory practices” based on a list of unlawful grounds. The 
Canadian Act does not attempt to reach this objective by mean of 
a precedence rule, but rather by the implementation of a system of 
investigation, conciliation, settlement and sanction, composed of 
the Canadian Human Rights Commission established by its Part 
II, and of the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal established by its 
sections 48.1 to 48.9. This system will be further described in sec-
tion 4.2.1 of this report. 
 
Given their simultaneous application, partial inconsisten-
cies may exist between these two statutes and the Charter. For 
instance, sections 12 (“publication of discriminatory notices”) and 
13 (“hate messages”) of the Canadian Act prohibit certain dis-
criminatory actions in a way that is incompatible with the case 
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law relating to the protection of the freedom of expression under 
the constitutional Charter.112 
2.1.2. Territorial Laws 
 
The three Canadian territories, whose jurisdiction derives, 
contrary to that of provinces, from the federal law and not from 
the supreme law, have each adopted a human rights statute. In 
the Yukon, the adoption of the Human Rights Act113 (the “HRA of 
the Yukon”) dates back to 1987. 
 
Following the creation of Nunavut in 1999 from part of its 
former territory, the Northwest Territories adopted, in 2002, a new 
Human Rights Act114, and in 2003 Nunavut adopted its first stat-
ute with the same title115 (respectively, the “HRA of the N.T.” and 
the “HRA of Nunavut”). These two statutes came into force in 2004, 
thereby replacing the old Fair Practices Act, in force since 1990. 
 
Whereas the HRA of the N.T. is silent on the matter, those of 
the Yukon and Nunavut provide particular rules for their prece-
                                                 
112.  In Warman v. Lemire, 2009 TCDP 26 (CanLII), a judge of the Canadian 
Human Rights Tribunal came to the following conclusion: 
[TRANSLATION] I concluded that Mr. Lemire contravened section 13 of the Sta-
tute […] in the case of the article intitled “AIDS Secrets”. I also concluded, howev-
er, that subsection 13(1) and subsections 54(1) and 54(1.1) are incompatible with 
paragraph 2(b) of the Charter, that guarantees freedom of thought, belief, opinion 
and expression. The limit imposed by these provisions is not a reasonable limit 
within the meaning of section one of the Charter. Since a formal declaration of 
invalidity cannot be pronounced by the Tribunal (see Cuddy Chicks Ltd. v. Ontar-
io (Commission des relations de travail), 1991 CanLII 57 (CSC), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 5), 
I simply refuse to apply these provisions for the purposes of the complaint filed 
against Mr. Lemire, and I am not issuing any remedial order against him 
(see Nova Scotia (Workers' Compensation Board) v. Martin, 2003 SCC 54 (CanLII), 
2003 SCC 54, at paragraphs 26 and 27). 
This decision was the subject of judicial review, the appeal of which took place on 
13 December 2011 in front of the Federal Court of Appeal. 
113.  Human Rights Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 116 [HRA of the Yukon]. 
114.  Human Rights Act, S.N.W.T. 2002, c. 18 [HRA of the N.T.]. 
115.  Human Rights Act, S.Nu. 2003, c. 12 [HRA of Nunavut]. 
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dence. All three of them expressly provide that they are binding 
upon the government of the territory.116 
 
In conformity with formal constitution law, the human 
rights statute of each territory expressly provides that it does not 
infringe or abridge the rights recognized to Aboriginal peoples by 
section 35 of the C.A. 1982.117 Besides, the HRA of the Yukon must 
be “interpreted in a manner consistent with the preservation and 
enhancement of the multi-cultural heritage of the residents of the 
Yukon”, pursuant to its section 2, which is almost identical to sec-
tion 27 of the Charter.118  
 
The HRA of Nunavut is somewhat unique in the sense that, 
pursuant to its section 2, its application must take place within 
the framework of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, “a collective term com-
monly used in Nunavut to define all values associated with tradi-
tional Inuit culture”.119  Section one of Nunavut’s Education Act 
gives a few examples of Inuit Qaujimajatuqangit, including “Inuu-
qatigiitsiarniq (respecting others, relationships and caring for peo-
ple)”, “Pijitsirniq (serving and providing for family or community, 
or both)”, and “Aajiiqatigiinniq (decision making through discus-
sion and consensus)”. 
 
These three statutes’ main purposes are to promote equality 
of opportunities and to provide protection against discrimination 
based on a limitative list of enumerated grounds in the fields of 
                                                 
116.  HRA of the N.T., supra note 114, s. 4; HRA of the Yukon, supra note 113, 
s. 38; HRA of Nunavut, supra note 115, s. 6. 
117.  HRA of the N.T., supra note 114, s. 2; HRA of the Yukon, supra note 113, 
s. 1; HRA of Nunavut, supra note 115, s. 3-4. 
118.  About s. 27 of the Charter, see R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 [Keeg-
stra] (Lexum unpaginated electronic version). For examples of application, see 
inter alia R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713 at 758;  Big M 
Drug Mart, supra note 11 at para. 99; A. (L.L.) v. B. (A.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 536 at 
para. 63; Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143 (McIn-
tyre J.) at 171; R. v. Tran, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 951 (Lexum unpaginated electronic 
version). 
119.  See “General Information”, online: Nunavut Human Rights Tribunal 
<http://www.nhrt.ca/> (Consulted on 10 March 2012). 
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employment, the supply of goods and services to the public, and 
tenancy. They also contain  protections against harassment and 
discriminatory intimidation. Only the Northwest Territories and 
Nunavut laws also protect against publications that express or 
imply discrimination, or incite to it.120 Similarly to the Charter, the 
three statutes expressly exclude positive discrimination from their 
scope of application. 121  Their respective lists of enumerated 
grounds are, except for some particularities, identical.122 In addi-
tion to protection against discrimination, the HRA of the Yukon 
also provides for a bill of rights that resembles the Canadian Bill. 
 
2.2. In Provincial Law 
 
Each of the ten provinces has endowed itself with a human 
rights statute. As with the territorial statutes, all of these provin-
cial statutes provide, at a minimum, protection against discrimi-
nation based on a limitative list of enumerated grounds, in the 
fields of employment, the supply of goods and services to the pub-
lic, and tenancy. Saskatchewan and Quebec stand out, because 
they adopted statutes protecting a broader range of rights.  
 
Except for British Columbia, where it would have been of 
no use given section 14 of its Interpretation Act,123 all of these 
statutes expressly provide that they are binding upon the Crown 
of their respective province (or the state, in the case of Quebec). 
With the exception of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, each of 
them provides for its precedence over other statutes and regula-
tions of the province, whether prior or future. 
 
                                                 
120.  HRA of the N.T., supra note 114, s. 13; HRA of Nunavut, supra note 115, 
s. 14. 
121.  HRA of the N.T., supra note 114, s. 67; HRA of the Yukon, supra note 113, 
s. 13; HRA of Nunavut, supra note 115, s. 7(2). 
122.  See Northwest Territories Human Rights Commission and Yukon Human 
Rights Commission, Know Your Rights: Human Rights in the Northwest Territories 
and Yukon, June 2011 at 7-17. 
123.  Interpretation Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 238, s. 14. 
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Leaving aside the rather odd and definitely colourable 1946 
Alberta Bill of Rights124 which the following year was held uncon-
stitutional by the Privy Council on division of powers grounds – for 
notably relating to “banking” without being severable125 –, Sas-
katchewan acted as a precursor by adopting, as early as 1947, the 
Saskatchewan Bill of Rights, the first statute in the history of Can-
ada to deal with human rights in a global way. Similarly to the 
Racial Discrimination Act adopted by the Ontario legislator three 
years before, however, it was a penal statute: its enforcement was 
only effected by way of conviction and fines. Its implementation 
was therefore hampered by the requirement of a proof beyond rea-
sonable doubt, and its logic remained alien to the indemnification 
of the person whose rights had been infringed. Provinces then 
progressively adopted statutes providing for mediation and repara-
tion, and setting up implementation mechanisms composed of 
commissions and jurisdictional bodies, inspired by the New York 
model.126 This led, in 1951, to the adoption of the Saskatchewan 
Human Rights Commission Act. In 1979, Saskatchewan “codified” 
and unified its human rights legislation by adopting the Sas-
katchewan Human Rights Code. 127  While its Part II protects 
against discrimination in the same way other provincial statutes 
do, its Part I consists of a general bill of rights. 
 
It was Ontario, however, which was the first province, in 
1962, to actually codify its various human rights statutes in a sin-
gle instrument called the Human Rights Code, 128  which estab-
lished a commission. 
 
                                                 
124.  An Act Respecting the Rights of Alberta Citizens, S.A. 1946, c. 11. This Act 
was an attempt at “quasi-constitutionalizing” the Social Credit’s program. 
125.  Alberta (A.G.) v. Canada (A.G.), [1947] A.C. 503 (P.C.). 
126.  Brooke JEFFREY & Philip ROSEN, “The Protection of Human Rights in Can-
ada” (1979) 2:3 Canadian Parliamentary Review 37. 
127.  Saskatchewan Human Rights Code, S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1. 
128.  Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19. 
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Nova Scotia adopted its first Human Rights Act in 1963, and 
endowed it with a commission in 1967. This statute underwent a 
major overhaul in 1991.129 
 
New Brunswick’s Human Rights Act was originally adopted 
in 1967, replaced in 1971, and significantly revised and modern-
ised in 2011.130 
 
In 1968, Prince Edward Island adopted the Human Rights 
Code, replaced in 1975 by the current Human Rights Act.131 
 
Newfoundland and Labrador’s Human Rights Code was first 
adopted in 1969, and replaced in 2010 by the Human Rights Act. 
132 Although it generally provides for its precedence, in accordance 
with section 35 of the C.A. 1982, it gives way to statutes and 
agreements of implementation of Aboriginal land claims agree-
ments.133 
 
Alberta adopted the Individual’s Rights Protection Act in 
1972, since renamed the Alberta Human Rights Act.134 
 
British Columbia’s Human Rights Code was adopted in 
1973, and reviewed comprehensively in 1984.135 
 
In 1974, Manitoba adopted The Human Rights Act, replaced 
in 1987 by The Human Rights Code.136 
 
                                                 
129.  Human Rights Act, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 214. 
130.  Human Rights Act, R.S.N.B. 2011, c. 171. 
131.  Human Rights Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. H-12. 
132.  Human Rights Act, S.N.L. 2010, c. H-13.1 [HRANL]. 
133.  Ibid., s. 4 and 7, relating to the Voisey’s Bay Inuit Impacts and Benefits 
Agreement, the Voisey’s Bay Innu Impacts and Benefits Agreement, and the La-
brador Inuit Land Claims Agreement Act. 
134.  Alberta Human Rights Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. A-25.5. About the 1946 Alberta 
Bill of Rights, see supra notes 124-125. 
135.  Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210. 
136.  The Human Rights Code, C.C.S.M. c. H175. 
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Finally, Quebec’s Charter of human rights and freedoms137 
(the “Quebec Charter”) was adopted in 1975. Like the other provin-
cial statutes on the matter, the Quebec Charter applies to private 
relationships as well as to those involving the state,138 while affect-
ing only, of course, “those matters that come under the legislative 
authority of Quebec”.139 It provides for its precedence and, as is 
the case for some other quasi-constitutional human rights stat-
utes, for a possibility of express derogation from it.140 When in 
doubt on the interpretation of another statute of the Quebec legis-
lature, however, before concluding that the Quebec Charter takes 
precedence over such a statute, the latter should be interpreted as 
being in keeping with the former.141 The Quebec Charter stands 
out from the crowd of provincial statutes on this matter, because 
it protects a more comprehensive range of fundamental rights, 
including certain rights that are unique to Quebec.142 There is, for 
instance, the right to assistance, and its corollary obligation to aid 
any person whose life is in peril, under certain conditions.143 The 
Quebec Charter also protects political rights (the right of petition to 
the National Assembly144  and the right to be candidate and to 
vote145), as well as judicial rights whose object is, in essence, the 
same as that of the Canadian Charter’s legal rights.146 It distin-
guishes itself even further by the protection that it bestows upon a 
wide variety of economic and social rights, including every child’s 
right to protection, ethnic minorities’ right to maintain and de-
velop their cultural life, and every person’s right to free public 
                                                 
137.  Charter of human rights and freedoms, R.S.Q. c. C-12 [Quebec Charter]. 
138.  Ibid., s. 54. 
139.  Ibid., s. 55. 
140.  Ibid., s. 52. 
141.  Ibid., s. 53. 
142.  Ibid., s. 1-9. 
143.  Ibid., s. 2. 
144.  Ibid., s. 21. 
145.  Ibid., s. 22. 
146.  Ibid., s. 23-38. 
The Codification 
(2012) 42 R.D.U.S. of Human Rights 551 
 in Canada 
 
 
 
education, to information, and to live in a healthful environment 
in which biodiversity is preserved.147 
 
Moreover, the protection against discrimination might be of 
a wider extent under the Quebec Charter than under other in-
struments. Inspired by the ECHR, the Quebec Charter protects, in 
addition to the more general right to equality,148 the more specific 
right to an equal recognition and exercise of one’s human rights 
and freedoms. 149  The corresponding provision of the Canadian 
Charter only relates to gender equality.150 
 
3. THE ROLE OF SUPRANATIONAL LAW: A MATERIAL 
SOURCE OF INCONSTANT AUTHORITY 
 
Supranational law’s only authority, in Canadian law, is as a 
material source of law, not as a formal one. On this basis, it exerts 
a varying authority, based on an undetermined number of factors. 
It encompasses not only treaties that were ratified by Canada but 
have yet to be incorporated in its domestic law,151 but also values 
and principles enshrined in international law, and by the interna-
tional society.152 The Supreme Court sometimes speaks equally of 
the two.153 
 
This relative authority has, until now, only been recognized 
with regard to supranational law relating to human rights, in 
cases where the Charter was invoked. As Ghislain Otis pointed 
                                                 
147.  Ibid., s.39-48. On this matter, see Pierre Bosset & Lucie Lamarche eds., 
Droit de cité pour les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels – La Charte 
québécoise des droits et libertés en chantier, Yvon Blais, 2011. 
148.  Quebec Charter, supra note 137, s. 10-20.1. 
149.  Ibid., s. 10. 
150.  Ibid., s. 28. 
151.  See Health Services, supra note 81 at para. 70 (about the Charter only); 
Ordon Estate v. Grail, [1998] 3 S.C.R. 437 [Ordon]; Daniels v. White, [1968] 
S.C.R. 517 [Daniels]; Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. 
Canada (A.G.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 76 at para. 31. 
152.  Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 
817 [Baker] at para. 70; R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 at para. 175-176. 
153.  Hape, supra note 56 at para. 53; Fraser, supra note 81 at para. 75. 
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out, however, constitutional rights of Aboriginal peoples are not 
any less important than those protected by the Charter, making it 
hard to justify a limitation of supranational law’s authority to the 
latter.154 
 
Regarding the way this authority operates, the Supreme 
Court qualified it as a “rule of construction”,155 and as an “aid in 
interpreting”. 156  In the same way that unwritten constitutional 
principles, or even pursuant to such a principle, unincorporated 
supranational law can intercede in case of gaps or ambiguities in 
domestic positive law.157 The Supreme Court has also spoken of a 
“presumption of conformity” of domestic law with international 
law. This expression, in reality, represents a presumption accord-
ing to which only compelling reasons can permit an interpretation 
of domestic law that runs contrary to international law.158 Legal 
authorities tried to distinguish between ratified and unratified 
treaties with respect to this matter, considering the former as the 
basis of a persuasive authority, compared to the merely informa-
tive authority of the latter, which would be tantamount to the au-
thority of foreign law.159 However good this idea may seem to be, it 
                                                 
154.  Ghislain OTIS, “Les réparations pour violation des droits fonciers des 
peuples autochtones : leçons de la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme”, 
(2009) 39:1 Recherches amérindiennes au Québec 99. 
155.  See Daniels, supra note 151 at 541. 
156.  Baker, supra note 152 at para. 70; Society of Composers, Authors and 
Music Publishers of Canada v. Canadian Association of Internet Providers, [2004] 
2 S.C.R. 427 at para. 149 (LeBel J.). 
157.  See Schavernoch v. Canada (Foreign Claims Commission), [1982] 1 
S.C.R. 1092 at 1098. See also Keegstra, supra note 118 at 750; Slaight, supra 
note 38 at 1056-1057; Capital Cities Communications Inc. v. Canadian Radio-
Television Commission, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 141 at 173; Daniels, supra note 151 at 
540-541; Inland Revenue Commissioners v. Collco Dealings Ltd., [1961] 1 All 
E.R. 762, [1962] A.C. 1. 
158.  Health Services, supra note 81 at para. 70; Hape, supra note 56 at para. 
54; Ordon, supra note 151151 at para. 137; Daniels, supra note 151151. 
159.  France HOULE & Noura KARAZIVAN, “Les rapports de relevance juridique 
entre les ordres législatifs canadien et international”, (2008) 1 Revue québécoise 
de droit constitutionnel 1 (online); France HOULE, “La légitimité constitutionnelle 
de la réception directe des normes du droit international des droits de la per-
sonne en droit interne canadien”, (2004) 45 Les Cahiers de droit 295; Jutta 
BRUNNÉE & Stephen J. TOOPE, “A Hesitant Embrace: The Application of Interna-
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is by no means self-evident that it is reflected in the current juris-
prudence of the Supreme Court. In fact, this jurisprudence refers 
much more willingly to the ECHR, in which Canada will never be a 
party, than to the American Convention on Human Rights,160 to 
which it could accede as a member of the Organization of Ameri-
can States. 
 
Suffice it to say that supranational law constitutes a mate-
rial source of Canadian constitutional law, the influence of which 
is modulated by a myriad of factors: the signature or ratification of 
the instrument, its prescriptive or programmatic nature, its cus-
tomary recognition, its object, etc.161 
 
4. JURISDICTIONAL ENFORCEMENT 
 
4.1. Of Constitutional Rights 
 
Subsection 52(1) of the C.A. 1982 provides that “The Con-
stitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law 
that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to 
the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.” In this con-
text, “of no force or effect” does not mean inoperative, but rather, 
“invalid”.162 By virtue of many of its provisions, the Charter is in 
some respect of a greater purview than subsection 52(1) of the 
C.A. 1982. Pursuant to its subsection 32(1), it allows the review of 
any action of the federal and provincial governments, so that the 
                                                 
tional Law by Canadian Courts”, (2002) Canadian Yearbook of International Law 
3. 
160.  American Convention on Human Rights, 22 November 1969, 1144 
U.N.T.S. 123. 
161.  For further research on the subject, see Stéphane BEAULAC, “Interlégalité 
et réception du droit international en droit interne canadien et québécois” in 
JurisClasseur Québec, loose-leaf ed., coll. “Droit public”, Droit constitutionnel, 
Montréal, LexisNexis Canada, 2011; “Le droit international et l'interprétation 
législative : oui au contexte, non à la présomption”, in O.E. FITZGERALD et al. eds., 
Règle de droit et mondialisation : rapports entre le droit international et le droit 
interne, Cowansville, Yvon Blais, 2006, 413-454; Gibran Van Ert, Using Interna-
tional Law in Canadian Courts, 2nd ed., Toronto, Irwin Law, 2008. 
162.  Re Manitoba Language Rights, supra note 8 at para. 52. 
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rights it protects are enforceable against measures of individual 
scope that cannot necessarily be qualified as legal norms, or law. 
 
In Canada, constitutional judicial review is decentralized. It 
developed as a natural extension of the rule of law, beginning as a 
control of the conformity of colonial legal rules to British imperial 
law. The higher courts, that is to say, provincial and territorial 
Superior or Supreme Courts, the Federal Court (to a large extent), 
the provincial, territorial and federal Courts of Appeal, and the 
Supreme Court of Canada (the final instance in all fields), are 
competent for judicial review, including constitutional review, and 
their decisions are effective erga omnes. Subject to the rules of res 
judicata and rationæ loci (territorial jurisdiction), a higher court’s 
determination that a generally binding norm is invalid shall apply 
to all, and not only between the parties. The lower courts, such as 
the Provincial Courts, hold an indirect and ancillary jurisdiction 
for judicial review. Their decisions are only effective inter partes, 
and create or declare rights of individual scope. Administrative 
bodies and decision makers empowered to determine questions of 
law are also entitled to apply constitutional law in the manner of a 
lower court, but their conclusions in that respect can easily be 
reviewed by higher courts. Since it relates to review on the issue of 
validity, the foregoing only concerns judicial decisions based on 
rigid constitutional law. Decisions based purely on flexible consti-
tutional law can only be a source of law of a general scope inas-
much as they contribute to the jurisprudence, following the 
principle of stare decisis. 
 
The “normal” method of constitutional review, at least theo-
retically, is to allege unconstitutionality in a specific pending dis-
pute, whether civil or criminal, or in the review process of an act of 
the administration that may concretely affect the plaintiff. In prac-
tice, however, a more abstract form of review may take place in 
one of two ways: by referral procedure, or by taking advantage of 
the relaxing in recent years of the conditions of recognition of a 
public interest standing. 
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While an appeal takes place in the ordinary procedure of 
litigation, a reference is a special procedure of an advisory nature, 
whereby a government asks a court for its opinion. In theory, a 
reference opinion is neither binding nor precedential.163 Judicial 
practice, however, suggest that Canadian courts rely equally on 
appeal decisions and reference opinions.164 In any event, both of 
these contribute to a formal source of unwritten constitutional law 
of general scope: the jurisprudence. 
 
Beyond the mere validity review process, section 24 of the 
Charter allows a person whose rights have been violated, denied, 
or infringed in any other way, to seek reparation: 
 
(1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by 
this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a 
court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as 
the court considers appropriate and just in the circum-
stances.  
(2) Where, in proceedings under subsection (1), a court 
concludes that evidence was obtained in a manner that in-
fringed or denied any rights or freedoms guaranteed by 
this Charter, the evidence shall be excluded if it is estab-
lished that, having regard to all the circumstances, the 
admission of it in the proceedings would bring the admini-
stration of justice into disrepute. 
 
The range of remedies that may be obtained under subsec-
tion 24(1)165, which the Supreme Court considers as “a corner-
stone upon which the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the 
Charter are founded”,166 is as broad as the tribunal’s general ju-
risdiction to grant remedies167 combined with, in the case of a 
                                                 
163.  Re Criminal Code, (1910), 43 S.C.R. 434 at 436. See also Ontario (A.G.) v. 
Canada (A.G.) (Reference Appeal), [1912] A.C. 571; Gerald RUBIN, “The Nature, 
Use and Effect of Reference Cases in Canadian Constitutional Law” (1959-1960) 
6 McGill Law Review 168. 
164.  Ontario (A.G.) v. Canada Temperance Federation, [1946] A.C. 193 at 206. 
165.  See H. JEAN & G. LAPORTE, supra note 9 at para. 85-137. 
166.  R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 575 at para. 20 (the “Dunedin” 
case). 
167.  Ibid. 
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higher court with inherent jurisdiction, the equity dictum ubi jus 
ibi remedium168 enable it to be: new trial, acquittal, new hearing, 
stay of proceedings169 , reduction of sentence, declaratory judg-
ment, injunction or other form of mandatory order170, damages171, 
and so forth, including costs against the Crown172. 
It is however important to make a distinction between the 
higher and the lower courts on this issue. The former are always 
competent to grant remedies pursuant to subsection 24(1) (though 
they have full discretion to refuse),173 and even the legislator may 
not curtail this jurisdiction,174 whereas the latter, including ad-
ministrative tribunals, may do so only if empowered by statute to 
grant remedy of the kind that is sought.175 
 
The availability of damages as a remedy under subsection 
24(1) of the Charter was only recently confirmed in Ward in 
2010.176 It must be understood that damages pursuant to this 
provision are awarded at the expense of the Crown or of the public 
entity called into question and to which the Charter applies, if it 
owns a patrimony; but not at the expense of their servants, 
agents, employees, contractors, or any other actors to which the 
Charter does not apply.177  
  
Except in presence of bad faith, abuse of power or gross 
negligence, the state may not be held liable in damages under 
                                                 
168.  This maxim means “where there is a right, there is a remedy”, or “where 
there is a wrong, there is a remedy”. See inter alia 3 William Blackstone Com-
mentaries on the Laws of England §23. 
169.  R. v. Bellusci, 2012 SCC 44. 
170.  Canada (A.G.) v. PHS Community Services Society, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 134 at 
para. 141-153. 
171.  About the recently recognized possibility to obtain damages pursuant to 
subsection 24(1), see Vancouver (City) v. Ward, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 28 [Ward]. 
172.  R. v. 974649 Ontario Inc., supra note 166. 
173.  Mills v. La Reine, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863 at 894-896. 
174.  Rahey, supra note 57; R. v. Smith, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1120 at 1129. 
175.  R. v. Conway, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 765 at para. 82. 
176.  Ward, supra note 171. 
177.  Ibid. at para. 22. In this case, the provincial Crown was deemed liable in 
damages under subsection 24(1) of the Charter for the action of municipal police 
officers. 
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subsection 24(1) of the Charter for an injury resulting from the 
adoption or application of a legislative provision that was not yet 
declared unconstitutional.178  Regarding actions of the executive 
power, however, this “immunity” can only come into play when the 
action was determined by and attributable to the impugned legis-
lative provision.179 
 
Finally, in order to exclude evidence pursuant to subsection 
24(2), it must be established that, “having regard to all the cir-
cumstances”, the admission of such evidence would “bring the 
administration of justice into disrepute”. According to Grant, when 
performing this analysis, a court must “assess and balance the 
effect of admitting the evidence on society’s confidence in the jus-
tice system”, having regard to three factors: “the seriousness of the 
Charter-infringing state conduct”, “the impact of the breach on the 
Charter-protected interests of the accused”, and “society’s interest 
in the adjudication of the case on its merits”.180 
 
4.2. Of Quasi-Constitutional Rights 
 
Quasi-constitutional statutes on human rights always are 
(except for the Canadian Bill) the basis of an implementation sys-
tem comprising one or two specialized bodies: either a tribunal of 
the “direct access” model accompanied or not by a commission, or 
a commission combined with a jurisdictional body. 
 
Human rights commissions are mandated to receive com-
plaints from individuals or groups of individuals regarding viola-
tions of the rights protected by their respective empowering 
statute. They promote alternative forms of dispute resolution. 
                                                 
178.  Mackin v. New Brunswick (Minister of Finance); Rice v. New Brunswick, 
[2002] 1 S.C.R. 405 at para. 78 (Gonthier J., majority reasons). Justice Gonthier 
referred to Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Greater Winnipeg, [1971] S.C.R. 957 and 
Central Canada Potash Co. v. Government of Saskatchewan, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 42.  
179.  See Ward, supra note 171 at para. 41. 
180.  See majority reasons in R. v. Grant, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353 at para. 71 
(McLachlin and Charron JJ.), rewording the criteria of R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 
S.C.R. 265. 
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Commissions’ mandate to defend human rights usually allows 
them to file complaints on their own initiative when the public in-
terest requires it. Some commissions may give advisory opinions 
or issue declaratory judgments determining the discriminatory 
nature of an action or an omission. 
 
Beyond a few minor differences, the complaint process is 
generally the same in every system composed of a commission 
combined with a jurisdictional body. The first step is the examina-
tion and investigation of the complaint by the Commission, during 
which mediation is encouraged between the parties. The Commis-
sion may, at this stage, dismiss a complaint on various grounds, 
in which case the complainant may apply to the jurisdictional 
body for a review of that decision. If the Commission determines 
that it is warranted by the situation, it transfers the complaint to 
that body.  
 
These jurisdictional bodies, whether they are a tribunal, a 
panel of adjudicators, or a board of inquiry, are independent enti-
ties that deal with complaints referred to them, and with applica-
tions for review of the Commissions’ decisions to dismiss 
complaints. If they agree with a complainant, they may command 
the other party to cease all violations of the complainant’s rights, 
and order various corrective measures, such as indemnification or 
the granting of what was discriminatorily refused. The decisions of 
these bodies, which sometimes have a judicial tribunal status, are 
usually as binding and enforceable as a higher court’s decision 
would be, but they are subject to appeal, or, failing that, to judi-
cial review, in front of the superior or appellate court. 
 
In most provinces, when a Commission transfers a com-
plaint to a jurisdictional body, the Commission does not represent 
complainants before that body: its role is to represent the public 
interest in an objective manner. Some Commissions, however, 
may represent the complainant for all procedures. 
 
The Codification 
(2012) 42 R.D.U.S. of Human Rights 559 
 in Canada 
 
 
 
In the “direct access” model, on the other hand, tribunals 
hear, in an adversarial process, the disputes that are brought be-
fore them by individuals alleging a violation of their rights. 
 
Often, complainants are not prevented from seeking en-
forcement before the ordinary courts of law, and they may choose 
between the two procedural avenues. 
 
Violation of the human rights statute is a penal offence in a 
majority of provinces and territories, while breach of an order ren-
dered pursuant to it almost always is. Such an offence is punish-
able on summary conviction by way of monetary fine. In some 
provinces and territories, such as Yukon, however, only wilful ob-
struction or interference with a person acting under the authority 
of the Act, retaliation or threat of retaliation, and report of false 
information to the Commission constitute penal offences.181 
 
4.2.1. In Federal Law 
 
As aforementioned in section 2.1.1 of this report, the Cana-
dian Act established the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the 
“CHRC”) and the Canadian Human Rights Tribunal (the “CHRT”). 
 
The CHRC has a dual mandate, since it also ensures com-
pliance with the Employment Equity Act.182 It began its work in 
1978, the year following the adoption of the Canadian Act.183 It is 
currently chairing the International Coordinating Committee of 
National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, within the United Nations. The CHRC renders between 600 
and 2000 decisions each year.184 
 
                                                 
181.  HRA of the Yukon, supra note 113, s. 29-32. 
182.  Employment Equity Act, S.C. 1995, c. 44. 
183.  See “About us: Our Mandate”, online: Canadian Human Rights Commis-
sion <http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/> (Consulted on 17 March 2012). 
184.  See “Resolving Disputes: Tools and Resources”, online: Canadian Human 
Rights Commission <http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/> (Consulted on 17 March 2012). 
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A National Aboriginal Initiative was put in place in order to 
coordinate “Commission activities related to First Nations and 
Aboriginal issues”, and to “foster a dialogue on how to incorporate 
the unique context of First Nations communities into human 
rights protection mechanisms”.185 
 
When the CHRC considers that a complaint is justified and 
that the mediation process is not yielding any result, it refers the 
complaint to the CHRT. The CHRT then holds a hearing and ren-
ders a judgment. The CHRT is the only body that has express ju-
risdiction to determine if an action is discriminatory pursuant to 
the Canadian Act. The CHRC and CHRT’s decisions may be judi-
cially reviewed by the Federal Court of Canada.186 The CHRT usu-
ally renders between 40 and 65 decisions each year.187 
 
4.2.2.  In Territorial Law 
 
The HRA of the N.T. and the HRA of the Yukon both provide 
for a system composed of a commission combined with a jurisdic-
tional body.188  In Yukon, the latter is a panel of adjudicators, 
called a board of adjudication to hear the complaints.189 In the 
Northwest Territories, it is an adjudication panel.190 
 
Any complaint relating to individuals or groups concerned 
by the Indian Act must, in Yukon, be referred to the Canadian 
Human Rights Commission. Some First Nations, however, are 
claiming exclusive jurisdiction over this matter by virtue of Chap-
                                                 
185.  “Expanding Knowledge: National Aboriginal Initiative”, online: Canadian 
Human Rights Commission <http://www.chrc-ccdp.ca/> (Consulted on 17 
March 2012). 
186.  See “About the CHRT: Jurisdiction – Canadian Human Rights Act”, on-
line: Canadian Human Rights Tribunal <http://chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/> (Consulted on 
17 March 2012). 
187.  See “Tribunal Decisions”, online: Canadian Human Rights Tribunal 
<http://chrt-tcdp.gc.ca/> (Consulted on 17 March 2012). 
188.  HRA of the N.T., supra note 114, parts 3-5; HRA of the Yukon, supra note 
113, parts 3-4. 
189.  HRA of the Yukon, supra note 113, s. 22 and ff. 
190.  HRA of the N.T., supra note 114, s. 48. 
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ter 13 of the Yukon self-government agreements. This claim is 
currently the subject of discussions between the Yukon Human 
Rights Commission, the Canadian Human Rights Commission and 
the First Nations.191 
 
The HRA of Nunavut, for its part, has established the Nuna-
vut Human Rights Tribunal (the “NHRT”), on the direct access 
model.192 In Nunavut, there is no commission mandated to con-
duct investigations for the complainants or to promote public 
awareness about human rights, and the NHRT has no staff whose 
function would be to investigate or to help complainants gather 
evidence. It is up to the parties to provide the NHRT with the rele-
vant information, and it is on the sole basis of this information 
that the NHRT will render its judgment. At the time of this report, 
the NHRT, which receives about one application per month, has 
conducted only two hearings.193 
 
4.2.3.  In Provincial Law 
 
Except Ontario and British Columbia, all provinces chose a 
system composed of a commission combined with various jurisdic-
tional bodies: the Saskatchewan Human Rights Tribunal, Alberta 
Human Rights Tribunals, the Manitoba Human Rights Board of 
Commissioners, the Labour and Employment Board appointed by 
the Minister to act as a Board of Inquiry in New Brunswick, 
Boards of Inquiry appointed by the Chief Adjudicator on the re-
quest of the Chairperson of the Commission in Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Boards of Inquiry appointed by the Chief Judge of the 
Provincial Court of Nova Scotia, and Human Rights Panels con-
sisting of one or more Commissioners of the Prince Edward Island 
Human Rights Commission. 
 
                                                 
191.  See “About us: The Yukon Human Rights Commission”, online: Yukon 
Human Rights Commission <http://www.yhrc.yk.ca/> (Consulted on 12 March 
2012). 
192.  HRA of Nunavut, supra note 115, s. 16. 
193.  See “Decisions of the Nunavut Human Rights Tribunal”, online: Nunavut 
Human Rights Tribunal <http://www.nhrt.ca/> (Consulted on 13 March 2012). 
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Ontario and British Columbia substituted a direct access 
system for their prior commission system. In British Columbia, 
parties apply to the Human Rights Tribunal by way of complaint. 
The tribunal offers mediation in order to resolve their dispute. It 
holds a hearing only in the event of failure in the mediation proc-
ess.194 In the absence of a commission, a minister of the govern-
ment is responsible to develop promotion and awareness programs 
for the public. A non-profit organization, the British Columbia 
Human Rights Coalition, was formed to overcome the lack of a 
commission. It promotes human rights and helps individuals to 
file their complaints before the tribunal.195 Ontario’s system, for its 
part, includes, since 2008, the Ontario Human Rights Commis-
sion and a direct access tribunal, the Human Rights Tribunal of 
Ontario.196 Complaints must be filed directly to the tribunal, by 
way of application. The Commission’s mandate, since 2008, is “to 
promote, protect and advance human rights through research, 
education and policy development”,197 and it is no longer involved 
in the complaint or investigation process. 
 
Quebec is among the provinces that adopted a commission 
based system. The Quebec Charter is thus implemented and en-
forced, in addition to the judicial courts, by the Commission des 
droits de la personne et de la jeunesse (the “CDPDJ”) established 
by its Part II, and by the Quebec Human Rights Tribunal (the 
“QHRT”) established by its Part VI, which came into force in 1990. 
The CDPDJ ensures the promotion and protection of the rights 
protected by the Quebec Charter, and of the children rights pro-
tected by the Youth Protection Act198  (the “YPA”) and the Youth 
Criminal Justice Act.199 It is also responsible for the application of 
                                                 
194.  Human Rights Code, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 210, s. 30. 
195.  See “About us”, online: The B.C. Human Rights Coalition, Your Rights to 
Know <http://www.bchrcoalition.org/> (Consulted on 17 March 2012). 
196.  An Act to amend the Human Rights Code, S.O. 2006, c. 30. 
197.  See Ontario Human Rights Commission, online: <http://www.ohrc. 
on.ca/> (Consulted on 17 March 2012). 
198.  Youth Protection Act, R.S.Q. c. P-34.1. 
199.  Youth Criminal Justice Act, S.C. 2002, c. 1. 
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the Act respecting equal access to employment in public bodies.200 
The CDPDJ fulfills all the usual mandates devoted to a human 
rights commission, as described above. When it identifies circum-
stances that could foster discrimination, it is competent to imple-
ment employment equity programs and affirmative action pro-
programs to remedy the situation.201 It is empowered to investigate 
any situation where it has reasons to believe that equality rights 
or children’s rights have been violated, whether upon an applica-
tion or on its own initiative. It must provide assistance in filing 
complaints to individuals, groups and organizations.202 
 
The filing of a complaint to the CDPDJ or the beginning of 
an investigation stay the limitation period of any civil suit relating 
to the same facts.203 In all cases, the CDPDJ investigates and en-
courages mediation between the parties. It can refuse to act on 
various grounds, including in the case of a frivolous or vexatious 
complaint and in the case of impossibility to gather sufficient evi-
dence. Such a dismissal must be rendered in a written decision 
explaining to the complainant the other recourses at his disposi-
tion, if applicable.204 If the complaint is neither dismissed nor set-
tled in mediation, the CDPDJ has the discretion to decide if it will 
be deferred to the QHRT or to an adjudicator. 
 
The QHRT is a “specialized, autonomous and independent 
judicial Tribunal [that] has as its mandate to hear and decide dis-
putes in the areas of discrimination, harassment, exploitation of 
the elderly and of handicapped persons, and affirmative action 
programs”.205 Its creation was meant to optimize the accessibility 
and efficiency of Quebec’s human rights jurisdictional process, by 
                                                 
200.  An Act respecting equal access to employment in public bodies, R.S.Q. c. 
A-2.01. 
201.  Quebec Charter, supra note 137, s. 86 and ff. 
202.  Ibid., s. 72. 
203.  Ibid., s. 76. 
204.  Ibid., s. 77-78. 
205.  See “The Human Rights Tribunal”, online: The Courts of Quebec 
<http://www.tribunaux.qc.ca/> (Consulted on 22 March 2012). 
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allotting the adjudication of complaints to a specialized body.206 
The QHRT does not function on the direct access model. Com-
plainants must, therefore, file their complaint with the CDPDJ 
first.207 If the latter decides to bring the case to the QHRT, it will 
act as the representative of the complainant, 208 in contrast to the 
vast majority of commissions, which only stand for public interest. 
If the CDPDJ concludes instead that the complaint should not be 
referred to a tribunal, the Quebec Charter provides that the com-
plainant may still take it to the QHRT, at his or her own ex-
pense209, but it is settled case law that the QHRT shall be validly 
seized if, and only if, the CDPDJ was nonetheless of the opinion 
that it had some merit210. 
 
The QHRT holds a hearing of the complaint. If it rules that 
there was an unlawful violation of a right protected by the Quebec 
Charter, it can order any remedy relating to the cessation of such 
violation and compensation for the injury resulting therefrom. No 
maximum is set for these damages. If the violation was inten-
tional, punitive damages may also be awarded.211 This decision 
can be appealed to the Quebec Court of Appeal, on permission of 
one of its judges.212 
 
The CDPDJ is also vested with the power to investigate acts 
or attempts of retaliation, as well as other breaches of the Quebec 
Charter, and to report them to the Attorney General and to the 
Director of Criminal and Penal Prosecutions.213 Violating the pro-
hibition of discrimination of sections 10 to 19, or the prohibition of 
exploitation of the elderly and the disabled of section 48 consti-
                                                 
206.  See “About the Tribunal : History”, online: The Courts of Quebec 
<http://www.tribunaux.qc.ca/> (Consulted on 22 March 2012). 
207.  Quebec Charter, supra note 137, s. 74 and 111 at para. 2. 
208.  Ibid., s. 80. 
209.  Ibid., s. 84. 
210.  Hajjage v. McGill University, 2012 QCCA 1272 (CanLII); Ménard v. Rivet, 
1997 QCCA 9973 (CanLII). 
211.  Ibid., s. 49. 
212.  Ibid., s. 132. 
213.  Ibid., s. 71(9). 
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tutes a penal offence.214 This is also the case with the taking of 
reprisals, and the obstruction of the work of the CDPDJ or of one 
of its member. The CDPDJ has jurisdiction to prosecute on its own 
initiative.215 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Even if quasi-constitutional protection of human rights has 
been a reality for a few decades already, their codification into the 
supreme law of Canada in 1982 proved to be a significant step 
forward. The benefits of quasi-constitutional protection mainly 
concentrated in the field of private law relations. As the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence relating to the Charter developed, the pro-
tection of the person against the action of the state, including the 
legislator, increased noticeably. This is particularly true for the 
fundamental freedoms of expression and religion, and for the legal 
rights. The picture is more mixed, however, regarding democratic 
rights. In contrast with the liberal interpretation of universal suf-
frage that led it to deem unjustified the privation of the right to 
vote of inmates serving a sentence of imprisonment of two years or 
more,216 the Supreme Court refused to recognize the principle of 
equal suffrage, by preferring an ambiguous notion of right to “ef-
fective representation”. 217  This notion nevertheless contributed, 
through its interactions with the electoral equal opportunity prin-
ciple, to the highest court holding that requiring all political par-
ties to present candidates in at least 50 electoral ridings in order 
to be allowed to register under the election law was unconstitu-
tional. It must be understood that registration procured some 
benefits, including, apart from financial and fiscal benefits, to 
have the name of the party appear on the ballots next to the can-
didates’ names.218 
 
                                                 
214.  Ibid., s. 134. 
215.  Ibid., s. 136. 
216.  Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519. 
217.  Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158. 
218.  Figueroa v. Canada (A.G.), [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912. 
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The constitutional Charter does not protect economic and 
social rights per se, which, in addition, are often weakly protected 
by flexible constitutional law.219 Indirect formal constitutional pro-
tection of union rights pursuant to the freedom of association 
granted by paragraph 2(d) of the Charter might be conceivable, but 
the Supreme Court’s case law on this matter could hardly be more 
unstable.220 A secondary route that could be taken by economic 
rights to accede to the supreme law is that of the right to security 
of the person under section 7. The Supreme Court, however, while 
theoretically leaving the door ajar for that possibility, tightly closed 
it in practice.221  
 
Section one of the Charter, which allows the state to justify, 
under some conditions, the restriction of a right or freedom pro-
tected by the Charter, leaves a margin of appreciation as wide as 
that recognized by the main national and supranational human 
rights jurisdiction. The Supreme Court’s decision in R. v. Oakes 
generated a phenomenon of cross-fertilisation of the jurispru-
dence.222 Section 33 of the Charter, which permits the suspension 
of some guarantees, has practically never been used, except by 
Quebec, which, indeed, never consented to the 1982 constitutional 
revision, and made extensive use of section 33 until 1993.223 
                                                 
219.  On this matter, see P. BOSSET & L. LAMARCHE, supra note 147147. 
220.  Supra note 81, and its corresponding text. 
221.  Gosselin, supra note 88 at para. 81-83. 
222.  M. DESCHAMPS, M. ST-HILAIRE & P. GEMSON, supra note 85. 
223.  Saskatchewan used Section 33 in order to protect a back-to-work legisla-
tion (The SGEU Dispute Settlement Act, S.S. 1984-85-86, c. 111, s. 9) and to neu-
tralize the effects of a decision of the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal that deemed 
the statute to be a breach of freedom of association. The Supreme Court finally 
ruled in favor of the province, making this suspension of rights useless. Alberta 
planned to use Section 33 in its Bill 26 of 1998. The derogation would have al-
lowed to limit the indemnity payable to victims of a provincial program of sterili-
zation. Public opposition, however, forced the government to back away. In 2000, 
in reaction to M. v. H., [1999] 2 S.C.R. 3, that held that the law should give the 
same benefits to de facto spouses than to other spouses, the Albertan legislator 
used Secion 33 to protect a statute providing that marriage could only be cele-
brated between a man and a woman. The Alberta Marriage Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. 
M-5, still provides at its paragraph 1(c) that “ ‘marriage’ means a marriage be-
tween a man and a woman”. Its paragraph 2(a), however, that provided that 
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Part II of the C.A. 1982, relating to special rights of Aborigi-
nal peoples, had huge systemic repercussions, even if this field of 
state relations with the First Nations revealed some limitations. 
While Native Peoples have won some disputes about their aborigi-
nal or treaty rights to engage in certain activities, the case law re-
lating to the aboriginal title limited itself to better defining the 
issues in order to invite the state to a little more good will in its 
efforts to settle aboriginal title claims out of court by entering into 
treaties.224 The fairness of the national treaties negotiation proc-
ess, however, is seriously questioned by experts, and is currently 
under review by the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights.225  The Supreme Court’s continued hesitance on how to 
conceive the relation between the Charter’s individuals rights and 
freedoms and Part II of the C.A. 1982’s Aboriginal peoples special 
rights, revealed by the aforementioned dissenting and concurring 
reasons, is also a source of concern. It is hoped, at least by us, 
that when the issue will truly arise in front of the Supreme Court, 
it will choose the approach suggested by Justice Deschamps in 
Beckman over the one suggested by Justice Bastarache in Kapp.226 
 
The Canadian human rights system is very easy to imple-
ment through litigation. This can probably be explained, on the 
one hand, by the coexistence of commissions227 and specialized 
tribunals responsible for the application of quasi-constitutional 
statutes, and on the other, by the decentralized nature of constitu-
tional review. This is only true on the strictly legal level, however, 
                                                 
“[t]his Act operates notwithstanding (a) the provisions of sections 2 and 7 to 15 of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms”, ceased to have effects on 23 
March 2005, five years after its coming into force, as provided for by Section 33. 
224.  On this matter, see Sylvette GUILLEMARD & Maxime ST-HILAIRE, 1982-
2001. Vingt ans de grands arrêts de la Cour suprême du Canada : 45 décisions 
choisies, présentées et commentées, Wilson & Lafleur, 2002 at 170-176. 
225.  Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group v. Canada, Inter-Am. C.H.R. no 592/07, ad-
missibility decision of 30 October 2009, online: <www.htg-
humanrights.bc.ca/petition%20592-07.pdf>. 
226.  Supra  note 96, and its corresponding text.  
227.  They are also responsible for non contentious implementation of human 
rights and freedoms, including promotion. 
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and financial accessibility to justice is another issue. The 2011 
edition of the Rule of Law Index published by the World Justice 
Project gave Canada a 76 % grade regarding accessibility to crimi-
nal justice, and 66 % regarding accessibility to civil justice. This 
places Canada at the 10th and 16th rank, respectively, on a total of 
66 ranked countries.228 Among countries with an equivalent level 
of revenues, Canada was still 10th and 16th on a total of 23. It 
needs to be pointed out, however, that one of the criteria of this 
index is the accessibility to “informal justice”. 
 
                                                 
228.  World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2011 at 14, online: The World 
Justice Project <http://worldjusticeproject.org/rule-of-law-index/> (Consulted 
on 2 April 2012). 
  
